Business School, Jiangsu Normal University, Xuzhou 221116, China.
Management Science Institute, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2020 Oct 22;17(21):7737. doi: 10.3390/ijerph17217737.
In the market, once consumers have a low-carbon preference, they will choose green low-carbon products. The market demand for green products is not only related to product price, but also consumers' low-carbon preference. In this way, enterprise has to consider the cost of carbon emissions in the process of production and operation. In this paper, we consider a two-level supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The supply chain system can determine the price of products and the level of carbon emission reduction through different supply chain contracts: wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. However, the power control structure of a manufacturer and a retailer is different, which will further affect the decision-making strategy of the supply chain system. We set up four models (Wholesale Price-NM and NR, and Revenue-Sharing-SR and SM) of the supply chain with carbon emission reduction, and calculated and analyzed. The results show that firstly, regardless of whether the manufacturer's power control structure or the retailer power structure is dominant, the manufacturer wholesale price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price, and it is inversely proportional to the revenue-sharing proportion. Secondly, under the two power control structures, the carbon emission level of the manufacturer with a contract on revenue-sharing is always lower than on wholesale price, and it gradually decreases with the increase of the revenue-sharing proportion of the manufacturers. Thirdly, when the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price. Under the manufacturer's power control structure, when the revenue-sharing ratio is small, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is higher than on wholesale price; when the revenue-sharing ratio is large, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is lower than on wholesale price. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by an example, and the sensitivity of the parameters is analyzed.
在市场中，一旦消费者具有低碳偏好，他们就会选择绿色低碳产品。绿色产品的市场需求不仅与产品价格有关，还与消费者的低碳偏好有关。这样，企业在生产经营过程中就不得不考虑碳排放成本。本文考虑了由制造商和零售商组成的两级供应链系统。供应链系统可以通过不同的供应链合同（批发价格合同和收益共享合同）来确定产品价格和减排水平。然而，制造商和零售商的权力控制结构不同，这将进一步影响供应链系统的决策策略。我们建立了具有减排的供应链的四个模型（带碳减排的批发价格-NM 和 NR，以及收益共享-SR 和 SM），并进行了计算和分析。结果表明：首先，无论制造商的权力控制结构还是零售商的权力结构占主导地位，制造商带有收益共享合同的批发价格总是高于带有批发价格合同的批发价格，并且与收益共享比例成反比。其次，在两种权力控制结构下，带有收益共享合同的制造商的碳排放量始终低于带有批发价格合同的制造商，并且随着制造商收益共享比例的增加而逐渐降低。第三，当零售商主导供应链时，带有收益共享合同的零售商销售价格总是高于带有批发价格合同的零售商销售价格。在制造商的权力控制结构下，当收益共享比例较小时，带有收益共享合同的零售商销售价格高于批发价格；当收益共享比例较大时，带有收益共享合同的零售商销售价格低于批发价格。最后，通过一个实例验证了模型的有效性，并对参数的敏感性进行了分析。
