Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland.
Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland.
Conscious Cogn. 2020 Sep;84:102990. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.102990. Epub 2020 Aug 14.
People often claim seeing images completely despite performing poorly. This highlights an issue with conscious representations. We introduce an experimental manipulation aiming to disentangle two prevalent positions: Rich views posit that people virtually represent the external world with unlimited capacity; Sparse views state that representations are reconstructed from expectations and information. In two experiments using the object recognition task, we tested two probe types: Images, which should aid reconstruction more, and Words, which should aid it less. From a sparse view, one should expect that Images lead to greater accuracy and reported experience. We found no reliable differences in accuracy and reported experience across probe types; however, we observed that the object positions influenced both accuracy and reported experience, which is surprising from a Rich view as it seemingly requires assumptions of different access across the visual field. Both theoretical positions thus currently need further development to explain our results.
人们经常声称自己在表现不佳的情况下仍能完全看到图像。这凸显了意识表现的一个问题。我们引入了一种实验操作，旨在区分两种流行的观点：丰富的观点认为，人们实际上是以无限的能力来代表外部世界的；稀疏的观点则表示，代表是从期望和信息中重建的。在两个使用物体识别任务的实验中，我们测试了两种探针类型：图像，应该更有助于重建；以及单词，应该更不利于重建。从稀疏的观点来看，人们应该预期图像会导致更高的准确性和报告的体验。我们没有发现探针类型之间的准确性和报告体验有可靠的差异；然而，我们观察到物体位置会影响准确性和报告体验，这从丰富的观点来看是令人惊讶的，因为它似乎需要在整个视野中做出不同的假设。因此，这两种理论观点目前都需要进一步发展，以解释我们的结果。
