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参与和提供公共物品：粒度重要吗？

Participation in and provision of public goods: Does granularity matter?

作者信息

Arlegi Ricardo, Benito-Ostolaza Juan M, Osés-Eraso Nuria

机构信息

Department of Economics, Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics (INARBE), Universidad Pública de Navarra, Campus Arrodadia, 31006 Pamplona, Navarra Spain.

出版信息

J Econ Interact Coord. 2021;16(2):265-285. doi: 10.1007/s11403-020-00293-3. Epub 2020 Jul 17.

DOI:10.1007/s11403-020-00293-3
PMID:32837569
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7367511/
Abstract

We use public goods games to experimentally investigate the effect of granularity (i.e., the degree of divisibility of the space of feasible contribution options) on participation (whether individuals contribute or not to the public good) and public goods provision (total contribution to the public good). Our results show that granularity has a significant effect on participation, mainly when coarser granularity eliminates the possibility of small contributions. However, this change in participation does not lead to a significant change in the total provision of the public good. These results are aligned with other experimental field results obtained in the context of donations and fundraising.

摘要

我们使用公共物品博弈实验来研究粒度（即可行贡献选项空间的可分程度）对参与度（个体是否为公共物品做出贡献）和公共物品供给（对公共物品的总贡献）的影响。我们的结果表明，粒度对参与度有显著影响，主要是在较粗粒度消除了小额贡献可能性的时候。然而，参与度的这种变化并没有导致公共物品总供给的显著变化。这些结果与在捐赠和筹款背景下获得的其他实验实地结果一致。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/f0d6a6f28772/11403_2020_293_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/1a1ecb6b9fb5/11403_2020_293_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/fab305d35839/11403_2020_293_Fig2_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/5fb79f5b8411/11403_2020_293_Fig3_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/24a1d1c680a8/11403_2020_293_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/f0d6a6f28772/11403_2020_293_Fig5_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/1a1ecb6b9fb5/11403_2020_293_Fig1_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/fab305d35839/11403_2020_293_Fig2_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/5fb79f5b8411/11403_2020_293_Fig3_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/24a1d1c680a8/11403_2020_293_Fig4_HTML.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/5dc4/7367511/f0d6a6f28772/11403_2020_293_Fig5_HTML.jpg

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本文引用的文献

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A tale of two contribution mechanisms for nonlinear public goods.非线性公共品的两种贡献机制之 tale
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Neurobiology of intelligence: science and ethics.智力的神经生物学：科学与伦理
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