Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.
Int J Health Policy Manag. 2022 Feb 1;11(2):239-242. doi: 10.34172/ijhpm.2020.164.
Managing conflict of interest (CoI) among the interested stake-holders in nutrition policy is a vexed and controversial issue. This commentary builds on Ralston and colleagues' highly informative analysis of the 44 submissions to the World Health Organization (WHO) draft tool on preventing and managing CoI in national nutrition programs. The commentary proposes that the commercial sector actors are, by definition, too conflicted to objectively respond to the draft tool. The responses of the commercial sectors are predictable, as they mimic their positions during the prior negotiation for the development of the Framework for Engagement of Non-State Actors (FENSA). Their overall approach, and specific responses, are typical of the now standard methods of the ultra-processed food and beverage industry's 'corporate playbook.' In addition, Ralston et al's analysis raises a number of other issues, such as: why these corporations are so keen to be included in the world of multi-stakeholder partnerships, why so few member states responded to the draft tool, and problems with the term 'private sector.' The commentary ends with a suggestion for WHO to seek broader involvement from the 160+ member states who have yet to participate in the consultations regarding the draft tool.
管理营养政策利益相关者之间的利益冲突(CoI)是一个棘手且有争议的问题。本评论是基于 Ralston 及其同事对向世界卫生组织(WHO)预防和管理国家营养计划利益冲突工具提交的 44 份意见的高度信息分析。该评论认为,商业部门的行为者从定义上讲,存在太多的利益冲突,无法客观地回应该工具草案。商业部门的反应是可以预测的,因为它们模仿了他们在制定非国家行为者参与框架(FENSA)之前的谈判中的立场。他们的总体方法和具体反应是超加工食品和饮料行业“公司策略”的典型方法。此外,Ralston 等人的分析提出了其他一些问题,例如:为什么这些公司如此热衷于被纳入多方利益相关者伙伴关系的世界,为什么如此少的成员国对工具草案做出回应,以及“私营部门”一词的问题。该评论最后建议世界卫生组织寻求更多尚未参与有关工具草案磋商的 160 多个成员国的更广泛参与。