Humphries John Eric, Neilson Christopher A, Ulyssea Gabriel
Department of Economics, Yale University, United States of America.
Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, United States of America.
J Public Econ. 2020 Oct;190:104244. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104244. Epub 2020 Aug 21.
The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) extended 669 billion dollars of forgivable loans in an unprecedented effort to support small businesses affected by the COVID-19 crisis. This paper provides evidence that information frictions and the "first-come, first-served" design of the PPP program skewed its resources towards larger firms and may have permanently reduced its effectiveness. Using new daily survey data on small businesses in the U.S., we show that the smallest businesses were less aware of the PPP and less likely to apply. If they did apply, the smallest businesses applied later, faced longer processing times, and were less likely to have their application approved. These frictions may have mattered, as businesses that received aid report fewer layoffs, higher employment, and improved expectations about the future.
薪资保护计划（PPP）提供了6690亿美元的可豁免贷款，这是一项前所未有的举措，旨在支持受新冠疫情危机影响的小企业。本文提供的证据表明，信息摩擦以及PPP计划“先到先得”的设计使其资源偏向了较大的企业，并且可能永久性地降低了其有效性。利用美国小企业的新每日调查数据，我们发现最小的企业对PPP的了解较少，申请的可能性也较小。如果它们确实申请了，最小的企业申请时间较晚，面临更长的处理时间，且申请获批的可能性较小。这些摩擦可能很重要，因为获得援助的企业报告称裁员减少、就业增加且对未来的预期有所改善。
