School of Civil Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran.
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, College of Environment, Karaj, Alborz, Iran.
Environ Monit Assess. 2020 Sep 1;192(9):612. doi: 10.1007/s10661-020-08567-w.
This study focuses on development of equilibrium strategy based on simulated annealing (SA) algorithm for balancing economic and environmental concerns in waste load allocation (WLA) problem. To resolve conflicts among various stakeholders, including Iran Department of Environment (DoE) as governmental authority and industrial and municipal dischargers, Stackelberg and Nash bargaining games have been applied in this WLA problem and the results have been compared. SA algorithm has been coupled to QUAL2Kw model to derive optimal WLA program and the environmental penalty tariff (EPT) in Nash bargaining and Stackelberg games. The proposed tools and methodologies were illustrated in a case study of multi-stakeholders WLA problem in Gheshlagh River, Sanandaj, Kordestan, Iran. The results indicate that lower BOD removal rates are allocated to the pollutant dischargers in the Stackelberg game compared to the Nash bargaining game. Furthermore, the EPT assigned by Iran DoE in Stackelberg and Nash bargaining games are 11.25 and 3.6 Rials/(gr/month), respectively. The estimated EPT in the Stackelberg game is close to the current tariff (10 Rials/(gr/month)) specified by Iran DoE on impermissible BOD discharges.
本研究旨在开发基于模拟退火（SA）算法的平衡策略，以平衡废物负荷分配（WLA）问题中的经济和环境关注点。为了解决包括伊朗环境部（DoE）作为政府当局和工业及市政排污者在内的各种利益相关者之间的冲突，本研究在 WLA 问题中应用了Stackelberg 和 Nash 讨价还价博弈，并对结果进行了比较。SA 算法已与 QUAL2Kw 模型耦合，以在 Nash 讨价还价和 Stackelberg 博弈中得出最优的 WLA 方案和环境惩罚关税（EPT）。所提出的工具和方法已在伊朗克尔德斯坦省 Sanandaj 的 Gheshlagh 河流的多利益相关者 WLA 问题的案例研究中进行了说明。结果表明，与 Nash 讨价还价博弈相比，Stackelberg 博弈中分配给污染物排放者的 BOD 去除率较低。此外，伊朗环境部在 Stackelberg 和 Nash 讨价还价博弈中分配的 EPT 分别为 11.25 和 3.6 里亚尔/（克/月）。Stackelberg 博弈中估计的 EPT 接近伊朗环境部规定的禁止 BOD 排放的现行关税（10 里亚尔/（克/月））。
