是否应该禁止道德机器？对 van Wynsberghe 和 Robbins“批判制造人工道德代理的理由”一文的评论。

Should Moral Machines be Banned? A Commentary on van Wynsberghe and Robbins "Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents".

机构信息

Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University, 1151 Richmond Street North, London, ON, Canada.

出版信息

Sci Eng Ethics. 2020 Dec;26(6):3469-3481. doi: 10.1007/s11948-020-00255-9. Epub 2020 Sep 2.

DOI:10.1007/s11948-020-00255-9

Abstract

In a stimulating recent article for this journal (van Wynsberghe and Robbins in Sci Eng Ethics 25(3):719-735. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8 , 2019), Aimee van Wynsberghe and Scott Robbins (hereafter, vW&R) mount a serious critique of a number of reasons advanced in favor of building artificial moral agents (AMAs). In light of their critique, vW&R make two recommendations: they advocate a moratorium on the commercialization of AMAs and suggest that the argumentative burden is now shifted onto the proponents of AMAs to come up with new reasons for building them. This commentary aims to explore the implications vW&R draw from their critique. In particular, it will raise objections to the moratorium argument and propose a presumptive case for commercializing AMAs.

摘要

在最近为该期刊撰写的一篇发人深省的文章中（van Wynsberghe 和 Robbins 在 Sci Eng Ethics 25(3):719-735. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8, 2019），Aimee van Wynsberghe 和 Scott Robbins（以下简称 vW&R）对支持构建人工道德代理（AMAs）的一些理由进行了严肃的批判。鉴于他们的批评，vW&R 提出了两条建议：他们提倡暂停 AMAs 的商业化，并建议现在将论证负担转移到 AMAs 的支持者身上，为构建 AMAs 提出新的理由。本评论旨在探讨 vW&R 从他们的批判中得出的含义。特别是，它将对暂停商业化的论点提出反对意见，并提出一个商业化 AMAs 的假设案例。