Program on Regulation, Therapeutics, and Law (PORTAL), Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts.
Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts.
JAMA Intern Med. 2020 Sep 1;180(9):1165-1172. doi: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2020.2771.
Market exclusivity for daily injections of glatiramer acetate, a disease-modifying therapy for multiple sclerosis, expired in 2015. In 2014, the manufacturer launched an alternate 3-times-weekly version that was widely adopted, sustaining market dominance of brand-name glatiramer until late 2017.
To estimate excess US spending associated with the transition from daily to 3-times-weekly glatiramer.
DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: This economic evaluation estimated total US glatiramer spending from January 1, 2011, to June 30, 2019, using a national cohort from 3 data sources that collectively represent approximately 40% of the US glatiramer market: Medicare Part D, Medicaid, and a claims database of commercially insured and Medicare Advantage patients.
Calendar quarter.
Outcomes were quarterly US glatiramer spending, estimated as price × use. Manufacturer list prices for generic products and estimates of net (postrebate) prices for brand-name products were used. Linear regression and interrupted time series models were used to compare spending trends in 3 periods: before generic competition (2011-2015), during generic competition for daily glatiramer (2015-2017), and during generic competition for daily and 3-times-weekly glatiramer (2017-2019).
From 2011 to 2015, US glatiramer spending increased to $962 million per quarter and did not decrease with generic competition of only daily glatiramer (2015-2017). After generic competition began for 3-times-weekly glatiramer in 2017, prices decreased by 47% to 64%, and spending decreased to $508 million per quarter in 2019 (P < .001 for slope). The delay in decreased spending from 2015 to 2017 was associated with excess spending of $4.3 billion to $6.5 billion.
These findings suggest that 2.5 years of delayed generic competition related to introduction of a new version of branded glatiramer acetate was associated with $4.3 billion to $6.5 billion in excess spending. Extended market exclusivity from introducing a new version of an existing brand-name drug can yield manufacturer returns out of proportion to the level of investment or risk involved; more limited incentives could encourage incremental innovations to existing drugs at a lower societal cost.
用于多发性硬化症的疾病修正疗法,每天注射的那他珠单抗的市场独占权已于 2015 年到期。2014 年,制造商推出了一种广泛采用的每 3 天注射一次的替代方案,这维持了品牌那他珠单抗的市场主导地位,直到 2017 年底。
估计从每日注射到每周 3 次注射那他珠单抗的转变带来的美国超额支出。
设计、设置和参与者:本经济评估使用来自三个数据源的全国队列,该队列共同代表了大约 40%的美国那他珠单抗市场,从 2011 年 1 月 1 日至 2019 年 6 月 30 日,估计了美国那他珠单抗的总支出:医疗保险 D 部分、医疗补助和商业保险和医疗保险优势患者的索赔数据库。
日历季度。
结果是每季度美国那他珠单抗的支出,估计为价格×使用量。使用仿制药产品的制造商建议零售价和品牌产品的净(返利后)价格估算值。线性回归和中断时间序列模型用于比较三个时期的支出趋势:在仿制药竞争之前(2011-2015 年)、在仅每日那他珠单抗的仿制药竞争期间(2015-2017 年)和在每日和每周 3 次那他珠单抗的仿制药竞争期间(2017-2019 年)。
从 2011 年到 2015 年,美国那他珠单抗的支出增加到每季度 9.62 亿美元,并且在仅每日那他珠单抗的仿制药竞争期间(2015-2017 年)并没有下降。2017 年每周 3 次那他珠单抗的仿制药竞争开始后,价格下降了 47%至 64%,2019 年支出降至每季度 5.08 亿美元(斜率 P <.001)。从 2015 年到 2017 年支出减少的延迟与推出新品牌那他珠单抗版本相关的 43 亿美元至 65 亿美元的超额支出有关。推出现有品牌新药新版本的延长市场独占权可能会带来制造商的回报,超出投资或风险水平;更有限的激励措施可能会鼓励对现有药物进行增量创新,从而降低社会成本。