Tada Mitsuhiro
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Kumamoto University, 40-1, Kurokami 2 chome, Chuo-ku, Kumamoto, 860-8555 Japan.
Am Sociol. 2020;51(4):446-469. doi: 10.1007/s12108-020-09464-y. Epub 2020 Oct 27.
This article clarifies the relationship between individual freedom and social order by relying on Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory and thereby defines sociology's contribution to social evolution as , which seeks otherwiseness in living experience and action. For this purpose, Luhmann's theory will specifically be compared with Emile Durkheim's and Alfred Schutz's sociological theories. Durkheim, a "child of the Enlightenment," considered freedom a collective ideal of moral individualism and conceived that the rational state realizes freedom by spreading the civil-religious human ideal for modern social order. In contrast, Schutz, following Henri Bergson, who criticized rationality for spatially fixing inner time, regarded freedom as a given in the individual's underlying duration, not as a shared ideal. Yet, unlike Bergson, he continued relying on rationalism, and he thought that the sociological observer observes how something appears to people with the epoché of natural attitude, not what it objectively is. Inheriting this phenomenological subjectivism, Luhmann showed that the self-referentiality of consciousness also applies to society: A social system, which path-dependently emerges itself from a double contingency, observes the world in its own way based on its self-referentially constituted eigen-time. On account of this system closure, and contrary to Durkheim's illuminist belief, there is no controlling entity in a highly evolved society, where freedom results from the enlarged, diversified possibilities of living experience and action (contingency). Thus, sociological enlightenment doubts self-evidence so that society brackets the taken-for-granted social order or social reality and amplifies individuals' deviations to evolve toward freedom.
本文借助尼克拉斯·卢曼的社会系统理论阐明了个人自由与社会秩序之间的关系,从而将社会学对社会进化的贡献定义为在生活体验和行动中寻求差异性。为此,将特别把卢曼的理论与埃米尔·涂尔干和阿尔弗雷德·舒茨的社会学理论进行比较。涂尔干是“启蒙运动的产物”,他将自由视为道德个人主义的集体理想,并设想理性国家通过传播公民宗教的人类理想来实现现代社会秩序中的自由。相比之下,舒茨追随亨利·柏格森,柏格森批评理性在空间上固定内在时间,舒茨则将自由视为个体潜在绵延中的既定之物,而非共享的理想。然而,与柏格森不同的是,他继续依赖理性主义,并且认为社会学观察者观察的是事物在自然态度的悬置中如何呈现给人们,而非其客观本质。继承这种现象学主观主义,卢曼表明意识的自我指涉性也适用于社会:一个社会系统,它从双重偶然性中路径依赖地自我产生,基于其自我指涉构成的本征时间以自己的方式观察世界。由于这种系统封闭性,与涂尔干的启蒙主义信念相反,在高度进化的社会中不存在控制实体,在那里自由源于生活体验和行动(偶然性)的扩大、多样化的可能性。因此,社会学启蒙对自明性表示怀疑,以便社会将被视为理所当然的社会秩序或社会现实搁置起来,并放大个体的偏差以朝着自由进化。