Fazekas Peter, Nemeth Georgina
Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark.
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium.
Front Neurol. 2020 Oct 9;11:565673. doi: 10.3389/fneur.2020.565673. eCollection 2020.
Hobson's AIM theory offers a general framework for thinking about states of consciousness like wakefulness, REM dreaming and NREM mentations in terms of a state space defined by the dimensions of the level of brain activity, the source of input, and the type of neurochemical modulation. This account inspired theoretical models of other altered states of consciousness-including hypnosis-claiming that studying REM dreaming can advance our understanding of these phenomena as well. However, recent developments showed that hypnosis is not a sleep like stage, and that the REM-centric attitude toward dreaming is mistaken. At the same time, the advancement of the neuro-cognitive theory claiming that dreaming and mind-wandering are on a continuum both underlain by default-mode network activity called many aspects of the AIM theory into question. Our aim in this paper is to show that certain hypnotic states-hypnotic dreams (experiences that subjects have in a hypnotic state as a result of an explicit suggestion to have a dream)-can, nevertheless, be highly relevant for the neuro-cognitive theory, and that their comparison with dreaming and mind-wandering has the potential to advance the field in unexpected ways.
霍布森的AIM理论提供了一个总体框架,用于从由大脑活动水平、输入源和神经化学调制类型等维度所定义的状态空间角度,思考诸如清醒、快速眼动睡眠做梦和非快速眼动睡眠思维等意识状态。这一观点启发了关于其他意识改变状态(包括催眠)的理论模型,声称研究快速眼动睡眠做梦也能增进我们对这些现象的理解。然而,最近的进展表明,催眠并非类似睡眠的阶段,而且以快速眼动为中心的做梦观点是错误的。与此同时,神经认知理论的发展声称做梦和思绪游荡处于连续统一体上,两者都由默认模式网络活动所支撑,这使得AIM理论的许多方面受到质疑。我们在本文中的目的是表明,某些催眠状态——催眠梦境(受试者因明确的做梦暗示而在催眠状态下所经历的体验)——然而,可能与神经认知理论高度相关,并且将它们与做梦和思绪游荡进行比较有可能以意想不到的方式推动该领域的发展。