Department of Psychology, Long Island University-Brooklyn, New York, NY, United States of America.
Goldman Sachs, New York, NY, United States of America.
PLoS One. 2020 Nov 10;15(11):e0241144. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0241144. eCollection 2020.
According to moral foundations theory, there are five distinct sources of moral intuition on which political liberals and conservatives differ. The present research program seeks to contextualize this taxonomy within the broader research literature on political ideology as motivated social cognition, including the observation that conservative judgments often serve system-justifying functions. In two studies, a combination of regression and path modeling techniques were used to explore the motivational underpinnings of ideological differences in moral intuitions. Consistent with our integrative model, the "binding" foundations (in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity) were associated with epistemic and existential needs to reduce uncertainty and threat and system justification tendencies, whereas the so-called "individualizing" foundations (fairness and avoidance of harm) were generally unrelated to epistemic and existential motives and were instead linked to empathic motivation. Taken as a whole, these results are consistent with the position taken by Hatemi, Crabtree, and Smith that moral "foundations" are themselves the product of motivated social cognition.
根据道德基础理论，有五种不同的道德直觉来源，政治自由派和保守派对此存在分歧。本研究旨在将这一分类法置于政治意识形态的更广泛研究文献中，这些文献将政治意识形态视为动机驱动的社会认知，包括保守判断通常具有维护系统正当性的功能的观察。在两项研究中，回归和路径建模技术的组合被用于探索道德直觉中意识形态差异的动机基础。与我们的整合模型一致，“约束性”基础（群体忠诚、尊重权威和纯洁性）与减少不确定性和威胁的认知和存在需求以及系统正当化倾向相关，而所谓的“个体化”基础（公平和避免伤害）通常与认知和存在动机无关，而是与同理心动机相关。总的来说，这些结果与哈泰米、克拉布特里和史密斯的立场一致，即道德“基础”本身就是动机驱动的社会认知的产物。
