Aydogan Ilke, Gao Yu
IESEG School of Management, Lille, France.
Department of Economics, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.
Exp Econ. 2020;23(4):1100-1128. doi: 10.1007/s10683-019-09641-y. Epub 2020 Jan 16.
A recent strand of the literature on decision-making under uncertainty has pointed to an intriguing behavioral gap between decisions made from description and decisions made from experience. This study reinvestigates this description-experience gap to understand the impact that sampling experience has on decisions under risk. Our study adopts a complete sampling paradigm to address the lack of control over experienced probabilities by requiring complete sampling without replacement. We also address the roles of utilities and ambiguity, which are central in most current decision models in economics. Thus, our experiment identifies the deviations from expected utility due to over- (or under-) weighting of probabilities. Our results confirm the existence of the behavioral gap, but they provide no evidence for the underweighting of small probabilities within the complete sampling treatment. We find that sampling experience attenuates rather than reverses the inverse S-shaped probability weighting under risk.
近期关于不确定性下决策的一系列文献指出了基于描述的决策和基于经验的决策之间存在的一个有趣的行为差距。本研究重新探讨了这种描述 - 经验差距，以了解抽样经验对风险决策的影响。我们的研究采用了完全抽样范式，通过要求无放回的完全抽样来解决对经验概率缺乏控制的问题。我们还探讨了效用和模糊性的作用，它们在当前大多数经济学决策模型中至关重要。因此，我们的实验确定了由于概率过度（或不足）加权而导致的与预期效用的偏差。我们的结果证实了行为差距的存在，但在完全抽样处理中没有提供小概率被低估的证据。我们发现抽样经验会减弱而非扭转风险下的倒S形概率加权。
