Oldofredi Andrea, López Cristian
Department of Philosophy, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Found Phys. 2020;50(11):1315-1345. doi: 10.1007/s10701-020-00377-x. Epub 2020 Sep 5.
Harrigan and Spekkens (Found Phys 40:125-157, 2010) provided a categorization of quantum ontological models classifying them as -ontic or -epistemic if the quantum state describes respectively either a physical reality or mere observers' knowledge. Moreover, they claimed that Einstein-who was a supporter of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics-endorsed an epistemic view of In this essay we critically assess such a classification and some of its consequences by proposing a twofold argumentation. Firstly, we show that Harrigan and Spekkens' categorization implicitly assumes that a complete description of a quantum system (its ontic state, ) only concerns , systems instantiating , properties. Secondly, we argue that such assumptions conflict with some current interpretations of quantum mechanics, which employ different ontic states as a complete description of quantum systems. In particular, we will show that, since in the statistical interpretation ontic states describe ensembles rather than individuals, such a view cannot be considered -epistemic. As a consequence, the authors misinterpreted Einstein's view concerning the nature of the quantum state. Next, we will focus on and , which in virtue of their relational and perspectival metaphysics employ ontic states dealing with relational properties. We conclude that Harrigan and Spekkens' categorization is too narrow and entails an inadequate classification of the mentioned interpretations of quantum theory. Hence, any satisfactory classification of quantum ontological models ought to take into account the variations of across different interpretations of quantum mechanics.
哈里根和斯佩肯斯(《发现物理学》40:125 - 157,2010年)对量子本体论模型进行了分类,若量子态分别描述的是物理实在或仅仅是观察者的知识,就将它们分类为 - 实在论的或 - 认知论的。此外,他们声称爱因斯坦——量子力学统计诠释的支持者——赞同一种关于 的认知观点。在本文中,我们通过提出双重论证来批判性地评估这种分类及其一些后果。首先,我们表明哈里根和斯佩肯斯的分类隐含地假定对量子系统的完整描述(其本体态, )仅涉及 、 系统实例化 、 属性。其次,我们认为这种假设与量子力学的一些当前诠释相冲突,这些诠释采用不同的本体态作为对量子系统的完整描述。特别是,我们将表明,由于在统计诠释中本体态描述的是系综而非个体,这种观点不能被视为 - 认知论的。因此,作者误解了爱因斯坦关于量子态本质的观点。接下来,我们将关注 和 ,它们凭借其关系性和视角性形而上学采用处理关系属性的本体态 。我们得出结论,哈里根和斯佩肯斯的分类过于狭隘,导致对上述量子理论诠释的分类不充分。因此,任何令人满意的量子本体论模型分类都应该考虑到量子力学不同诠释中 的变化。