Gärdenfors Peter
Cognitive Science, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
Faculty of Humanities, Palaeo-Research Institute, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa.
Front Psychol. 2020 Dec 8;11:584017. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.584017. eCollection 2020.
The world as we perceive it is structured into objects, actions and places that form parts of events. In this article, my aim is to explain why these categories are cognitively primary. From an empiricist and evolutionary standpoint, it is argued that the reduction of the complexity of sensory signals is based on the brain's capacity to identify various types of invariances that are evolutionarily relevant for the activities of the organism. The first aim of the article is to explain why places, object and actions are primary cognitive categories in our constructions of the external world. It is shown that the invariances that determine these categories have their separate characteristics and that they are, by and large, independent of each other. This separation is supported by what is known about the neural mechanisms. The second aim is to show that the category of events can be analyzed as being constituted of the primary categories. The category of numbers is briefly discussed. Some implications for computational models of the categories are also presented.
我们所感知的世界是由构成事件一部分的物体、动作和地点构成的。在本文中，我的目的是解释为什么这些类别在认知上是基本的。从经验主义和进化的角度来看，有人认为感觉信号复杂性的降低是基于大脑识别各种与生物体活动在进化上相关的不变性的能力。本文的首要目的是解释为什么地点、物体和动作是我们构建外部世界时的基本认知类别。研究表明，决定这些类别的不变性具有各自的特征，而且它们在很大程度上是相互独立的。这种分离得到了已知神经机制的支持。第二个目的是表明事件类别可以被分析为由基本类别构成。数字类别也会被简要讨论。还会介绍这些类别对计算模型的一些启示。
