Małecka Magdalena
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Unioninkatu 40A, P.O. box 24, 00014 Helsinki, Finland.
School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, 1 Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540 USA.
Synthese. 2021;199(1-2):5311-5338. doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03026-6. Epub 2021 Feb 5.
The aim of this article is to question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers' goals. This paper argues that the philosophical work of Helen Longino can also help us to have a better and fuller understanding of the knowledge which the behavioural sciences provide. The paper advances an analysis of the knowledge claims that are made in the context of policy applications of behavioural science and compares them with the behavioural research on which they are based. This allows us to show that behavioural policy and the debates accompanying it are based on an oversimplified understanding of what knowledge behavioural science actually provides. Recognising this problem is important as arguments that justify reliance on the behavioural sciences in policy typically presume this simplification.
本文旨在质疑将行为科学应用于公共政策制定中的认知预设。审视过行为科学近期在政策领域应用情况的科学哲学家们，为关于因果关系、证据以及随机对照试验的讨论做出了贡献。这些讨论聚焦于有关科学证据可靠性的认识论和方法论问题，以及在何种条件下我们能够预测一项基于行为研究的政策将实现政策制定者的目标。本文认为，海伦·朗基诺的哲学著作也能帮助我们更好、更全面地理解行为科学所提供的知识。本文对在行为科学政策应用背景下所提出的知识主张进行了分析，并将其与这些主张所基于的行为研究进行比较。这使我们能够表明，行为政策及其伴随的争论是基于对行为科学实际提供的知识的过度简化理解。认识到这个问题很重要，因为在政策中为依赖行为科学进行辩护的论点通常假定了这种简化。
