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在中间人攻击下,双向乒乓协议和LM05量子密钥分发协议的安全性如何?

How Secure Are Two-Way Ping-Pong and LM05 QKD Protocols under a Man-in-the-Middle Attack?

作者信息

Pavičić Mladen

机构信息

Center of Excellence for Advanced Materials and Sensors, Research Unit Photonics and Quantum Optics, Institute Ruder Bošković, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia.

Nanooptics, Department of Physics, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 12489 Berlin, Germany.

出版信息

Entropy (Basel). 2021 Jan 29;23(2):163. doi: 10.3390/e23020163.

DOI:10.3390/e23020163
PMID:33573044
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7911273/
Abstract

We consider a man-in-the-middle attack on two-way quantum key distribution ping-pong and LM05 protocols in which an eavesdropper copies all messages in the message mode, while being undetectable in the mode. Under the attack there is therefore no disturbance in the message mode and the mutual information between the sender and the receiver is always constant and equal to one and messages copied by the eavesdropper are always genuine. An attack can only be detected in the control mode but the level of detection at which the protocol should be aborted is not defined. We examine steps of the protocol to evaluate its security and find that the protocol should be redesigned. We also compare it with the security of a one-way asymmetric BB84-like protocol in which one basis serves as the message mode and the other as the control mode but which does have the level of detection at which the protocol should be aborted defined.

摘要

我们考虑对双向量子密钥分发乒乓协议和LM05协议进行中间人攻击,在这种攻击中,窃听者以消息模式复制所有消息,同时在该模式下无法被检测到。因此,在攻击下,消息模式不会受到干扰,发送方和接收方之间的互信息始终恒定且等于1,并且窃听者复制的消息始终是真实的。攻击只能在控制模式下被检测到,但未定义协议应中止的检测级别。我们检查协议步骤以评估其安全性,发现该协议应重新设计。我们还将其与单向非对称类BB84协议的安全性进行比较,在该协议中,一个基用作消息模式,另一个用作控制模式,但确实定义了协议应中止的检测级别。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/a2f4/7911273/4693d4b38980/entropy-23-00163-g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/a2f4/7911273/08604cb9c6c7/entropy-23-00163-g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/a2f4/7911273/4693d4b38980/entropy-23-00163-g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/a2f4/7911273/08604cb9c6c7/entropy-23-00163-g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/a2f4/7911273/4693d4b38980/entropy-23-00163-g002.jpg

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