Glasgow Caledonian University, Cowcaddens Road, Glasgow, G4 0BA, UK.
J Bioeth Inq. 2021 Jul;18(2):229-241. doi: 10.1007/s11673-021-10091-6. Epub 2021 Feb 22.
It is often maintained that, since the buying and selling of organs-particularly the kidneys-of living people supposedly constitutes exploitation of the living vendors while the so-called "altruistic" donation of them does not, the former, unlike the latter, should be a crime. This paper challenges and rejects this view. A novel account of exploitation, influenced by but different from those of Zwolinski and Wertheimer and of Wilkinson, is developed. Exploitation is seen as a sort of injustice. A distinction is made between justice and fairness. To exploit someone is to take advantage of him or her unjustly. Exploitation pertains to the nature of actions, interactions, and transaction rather than to their outcomes or to how they are perceived by exploitees. Desperation on the part of one or other of the parties to a transaction does not preclude the giving of valid consent to the transaction. Disparities of power or wealth between the parties to a transaction do not indicate or entail that the transaction will be exploitative. A disparity in the benefits that arise from a transaction between the parties does not indicate or entail that exploitation has taken place.
人们常认为,买卖活体器官(尤其是肾脏)的行为构成了对活体卖方的剥削,而所谓的“利他主义”捐赠则不然,因此前者应该是犯罪,而后者则不应是犯罪。本文对这种观点提出了质疑和反对。本文提出了一种新的剥削理论,这种理论受到了 Zwolinski 和 Wertheimer 以及 Wilkinson 的影响,但又有所不同。剥削被视为一种不公正。本文区分了公正和公平。剥削是指对某人的不正当利用。剥削涉及到行为、互动和交易的性质,而不是它们的结果,也不是剥削者对它们的看法。交易一方或双方的绝望并不能排除对交易的有效同意。交易双方之间的权力或财富差距并不表明或意味着交易具有剥削性。交易双方从交易中获得的利益差距并不表明或意味着发生了剥削。