Bouvé College of Health Sciences, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.
School of Public Health, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA.
Health Serv Res. 2021 Feb;56(1):7-15. doi: 10.1111/1475-6773.13613.
To determine the relationship between Medicare's site-based outpatient billing policy and hospital-physician integration.
National Medicare claims data from 2010 to 2016.
For each physician-year, we calculated the disparity between Medicare reimbursement under hospital ownership and under physician ownership. Using logistic regression analysis, we estimated the relationship between these payment differences and hospital-physician integration, adjusting for region, market concentration, and time fixed effects. We measured integration status using claims data and legal tax names.
The study included integrated and non-integrated physicians who billed Medicare between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2016 (n = 2 137 245 physician-year observations).
Medicare reimbursement for physician services would have been $114 000 higher per physician per year if a physician were integrated compared to being non-integrated. Primary care physicians faced a 78% increase, medical specialists 74%, and surgeons 224%. These payment differences exhibited a modest positive relationship to hospital-physician vertical integration. An increase in this outpatient payment differential equivalent to moving from the 25th to 75th percentile was associated with a 0.20 percentage point increase in the probability of integrating with a hospital (95% CI: 0.0.10-0.30). This effect was slightly larger among primary care physicians (0.27, 95% CI: 0.18 to 0.35) and medical specialists (0.26, 95% CI: 0.05 to 0.48), while not significantly different from zero among surgeons (-0.02; 95% CI: -0.27 to 0.22).
The payment differences between outpatient settings were large and grew over time. Even routine annual outpatient payment updates from Medicare may prompt some hospital-physician vertical integration, particularly among primary care physicians and medical specialists.
确定医疗保险基于场所的门诊计费政策与医院-医师整合之间的关系。
2010 年至 2016 年国家医疗保险索赔数据。
对于每一位医师-年,我们计算了在医院所有权和医师所有权下医疗保险报销之间的差异。我们使用逻辑回归分析,根据区域、市场集中程度和时间固定效应,调整这些支付差异与医院-医师整合之间的关系。我们使用索赔数据和法律税名来衡量整合状态。
该研究包括在 2010 年 1 月 1 日至 2016 年 12 月 31 日期间向医疗保险开具账单的整合和非整合医师(n=2137245 医师-年观察)。
与非整合医师相比,整合医师的每位医师每年的医师服务医疗保险报销将增加 114000 美元。初级保健医生增加了 78%,医学专家增加了 74%,外科医生增加了 224%。这些支付差异与医院-医师垂直整合呈适度正相关。这种门诊支付差异的增加相当于从第 25 百分位到第 75 百分位,与与医院整合的概率增加 0.20 个百分点(95%置信区间:0.0.10-0.30)相关。这种效应在初级保健医生(0.27,95%置信区间:0.18 至 0.35)和医学专家(0.26,95%置信区间:0.05 至 0.48)中略大,而在外科医生中则不显著(-0.02;95%置信区间:-0.27 至 0.22)。
门诊环境之间的支付差异很大,并且随着时间的推移而增长。即使是医疗保险的常规年度门诊支付更新,也可能促使一些医院-医师垂直整合,特别是在初级保健医生和医学专家中。