Xue Yangchen, Geng Xianhui, Kiprop Emmanuel, Hong Miao
College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China.
School of Business and Economics, Kabarak University, Kabarak 20157, Kenya.
Foods. 2021 Feb 18;10(2):451. doi: 10.3390/foods10020451.
The food safety strategies of companies are a key point in the reduction of food safety risks. In order to encourage the evolution of food safety strategies of companies from food fraud to safety investment, this study builds an evolutionary game model, taking large and small companies as participants, to reveal the dynamic process of spillover effects influencing the choice of food safety strategies of companies. The study shows that (1) the food safety strategies of companies change from safety investment to food fraud, along with the increasing opportunity costs of safety investment. (2) The costs structure of small companies mainly determines whether the industry reaches the equilibrium of safety investment, while the costs structure of large companies mainly determines whether the industry reaches the equilibrium of food fraud. (3) Both competition effects and contagion effects encourage companies to choose safety investment. The more obvious spillover effects of incidents on food safety are, the more likely it is that companies will choose safety investments. (4) Increasing the costs to companies for incidents on food safety and reducing the opportunity cost of safety investment motivates companies to choose safety investment. Consequently, a new orientation of regulations for food safety is formed: the government should allocate different regulatory resources to counteract food fraud behaviors or technologies with a different benefit, should increase the technical costs and costs incurred from committing acts of food fraud, and should expand spillover effects of incidents on food safety.
企业的食品安全策略是降低食品安全风险的关键所在。为了促使企业的食品安全策略从食品欺诈向安全投资转变,本研究构建了一个以大、小公司为参与方的演化博弈模型,以揭示溢出效应影响企业食品安全策略选择的动态过程。研究表明:(1)随着安全投资机会成本的增加,企业的食品安全策略从安全投资转变为食品欺诈。(2)小公司的成本结构主要决定行业是否达到安全投资均衡,而大公司的成本结构主要决定行业是否达到食品欺诈均衡。(3)竞争效应和传染效应都促使企业选择安全投资。食品安全事件的溢出效应越明显,企业越有可能选择安全投资。(4)提高企业因食品安全事件而承担的成本,降低安全投资的机会成本,会促使企业选择安全投资。因此,形成了食品安全监管的新方向:政府应分配不同的监管资源来应对具有不同收益的食品欺诈行为或技术,应增加食品欺诈行为的技术成本和实施成本,并应扩大食品安全事件的溢出效应。