Peking University Health Science Centre, Beijing, China.
Bioethics. 2021 Jun;35(5):438-445. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12865. Epub 2021 Mar 8.
Cooley's argument that persons with pre-dementia have a Kantian duty to die has led to much debate. Cooley gives two reasons for his claim, the first being that a person with pre-dementia should end his/her life when he/she will inevitably and irreversibly lose rationality and be unable to live morally as a result. This paper argues that this reason derives from an unsubstantiated premise and general confusion regarding the condition for a Kantian duty to die. Rather, a close reading of Kant reveals that such a condition occurs when a person confronts an external handicap that does not undermine his/her rational ability but deprives him/her of the possibility of living the way a person should. People do not confront this experience with progressive dementia. The other reason Cooley proposes is that a person should not allow their continued existence to become a burden to others. This claim partly stems from a radical interpretation of a case discussed by Kant and is partly based on a misuse of Kant's formulation of humanity. Based on a prudent inference from Kantian ethics, this article argues against Cooley that persons with pre-dementia have no Kantian duty to die.
库利（Cooley）提出，患有痴呆前期的人有康德式的死亡义务，这引发了很多争论。库利为他的主张提出了两个理由，第一个理由是，当一个患有痴呆前期的人不可避免地、不可逆转地失去理性，并且因此无法在道德上生活时，他/她应该结束自己的生命。本文认为，这个理由源于一个未经证实的前提和对康德式死亡义务条件的普遍混淆。相反，对康德的仔细阅读表明，当一个人面临一个外部障碍，而这个障碍不会削弱他/她的理性能力，但剥夺了他/她以应有的方式生活的可能性时，就会出现这种情况。患有进行性痴呆症的人不会面临这种经历。库利提出的另一个理由是，一个人不应该让自己的继续存在成为他人的负担。这一说法部分源于对康德讨论的一个案例的激进解释，部分基于对康德对人性的表述的误用。基于对康德伦理学的谨慎推断，本文反对库利的观点，即患有痴呆前期的人没有康德式的死亡义务。
