Byers Philippa
Plunkett Centre for Ethics, St Vincent's Hospital and Australian Catholic University, Sydney, Australia.
Theor Med Bioeth. 2016 Feb;37(1):61-9. doi: 10.1007/s11017-016-9351-2.
Kantian moral concepts concerning respect for human dignity have played a central role in articulating ethical guidelines for medical practice and research, and for articulating some central positions within bioethical debates more generally. The most common of these Kantian moral concepts is the obligation to respect the dignity of patients and of human research subjects as autonomous, self-determining individuals. This article describes Kant's conceptual distinction between dignity and autonomy as values, and draws on the work of several contemporary Kantian philosophers who employ the distinction to make sense of some common moral intuitions, feelings, and norms. Drawing on this work, the article argues that the conceptual distinction between dignity and autonomy as values is indispensable in the context of considering our obligations to those who are dependent and vulnerable.
康德关于尊重人类尊严的道德观念，在阐明医学实践与研究的伦理准则以及更广泛地阐明生物伦理辩论中的一些核心立场方面发挥了核心作用。这些康德式道德观念中最常见的是，有义务将患者和人类研究对象的尊严视为自主、自我决定的个体加以尊重。本文描述了康德在尊严与自主性作为价值观之间的概念区分，并借鉴了几位当代康德主义哲学家的著作，他们运用这一区分来理解一些常见的道德直觉、情感和规范。基于这项工作，本文认为，在考虑我们对那些处于依赖和脆弱状态的人的义务时，尊严与自主性作为价值观之间的概念区分是不可或缺的。
