Division of Psychiatry, Faculty of Brain Sciences, University College London, London, UK.
Gerontologist. 2022 Feb 9;62(2):286-292. doi: 10.1093/geront/gnab034.
Aging has been given short shrift as a topic in philosophy. The aim of this article is to redress this neglect by revisiting some of the key philosophical issues in Simone de Beauvoir's book, Old Age. In her notion of old age's unrealizability, its impossibility of fully embodying a subject position, and the role played by the other in denying such subjectivity, she draws upon the work of both Heidegger and Sartre. The dilemma she repeatedly draws attention to, of always seeming to age in ways other than as one's self, raises the question of whether any view of aging as an authentic subjectivity may be no more than, in Heidegger's words, a "chimerical undertaking." In examining how the concepts of bad faith and inauthenticity are used by Heidegger and Sartre, the article concludes that for both these writers, an authentic subject position can be maintained in later life, without ending up as the otherwise inauthentic subject of others' collective imaginary of "a good age."
衰老在哲学中一直被忽视。本文旨在纠正这种忽视,重新审视西蒙娜·德·波伏娃(Simone de Beauvoir)著作《老年》中的一些关键哲学问题。在她关于老年的不可实现性、不可能充分体现主体地位以及他人在否定这种主观性方面所扮演的角色的概念中,她借鉴了海德格尔和萨特的作品。她反复提请注意的困境是,人们总是以不同于自我的方式衰老,这就提出了这样一个问题,即是否可以将任何将衰老视为真正主体性的观点仅仅视为海德格尔所说的“虚幻的事业”。在考察海德格尔和萨特如何使用虚假意识和非真实性的概念时,本文得出结论,对于这两位作家来说,一个真正的主体地位可以在晚年保持,而不会成为他人对“好年龄”的集体想象中的非真实主体。