Staff Direction for Risk Assessment, Directorate General Control Policy, Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain, Bruxelles, Belgium.
Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Research Unit in Epidemiology and Risk Analysis Applied to Veterinary Sciences (UREAR-ULiège), Fundamental and Applied Research for Animal Health (FARAH) Centre, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium.
Transbound Emerg Dis. 2021 Sep;68(5):2761-2773. doi: 10.1111/tbed.14067. Epub 2021 Mar 23.
Since the introduction in Georgia in 2007 of an African swine fever (ASF) genotype 2 virus strain, the virus has rapidly spread to both Western European and Asian countries. It now constitutes a major threat for the global swine industry. The ongoing European transmission cycle has been related to the 'wild boar habitat' with closed transmission events between wild boar populations and incidental spillovers to commercial and non-commercial (backyard) pig holdings. During the epidemic in Belgium, only wild boar were infected and although the introduction route has not yet been elucidated, the 'human factor' is highly suspected. While ASF was successfully contained in a small region in the Southern part of Belgium without affecting domestic pigs, the risk of spillover at the wild/domestic interface remains poorly assessed. In this study, we used a semi-quantitative method, involving national and international experts, to assess the risk associated with different transmission routes for ASF introduction from wild boar to domestic pig holdings and subsequent dissemination between holdings in the Belgian epidemiological context. Qualitative responses obtained by our questionnaire were numerically transformed and statistically processed to provide a semi-quantitative assessment of the occurrence of the hazard and a ranking of all transmission routes. 'Farmer', 'bedding material', 'veterinarian' and 'professionals from the pig sector' were considered as the most important transmission routes for ASF introduction from the wild reservoir to pig holdings. 'Animal movements', 'farmer', 'veterinarian', 'iatrogenic', 'animal transport truck' and 'animal care equipment' were considered as the most important transmission routes posing a risk of ASF spread between pig holdings. Combined with specific biosecurity checks in the holdings, this assessment helps in prioritizing risk mitigation measures against ASF introduction and further spread in the domestic pig industry, particularly while the ASF situation in Western Europe is worsening.
自 2007 年在格鲁吉亚引入非洲猪瘟(ASF)基因型 2 病毒株以来,该病毒已迅速传播到西欧和亚洲国家。它现在对全球养猪业构成了重大威胁。正在进行的欧洲传播周期与“野猪栖息地”有关,野猪种群之间存在封闭的传播事件,并且偶然会溢出到商业和非商业(后院)猪群。在比利时的疫情中,只有野猪受到感染,尽管引入途径尚未阐明,但“人为因素”高度可疑。虽然 ASF 在比利时南部的一个小区域内成功得到控制,没有影响到国内猪群,但在野生/家养界面上的溢出风险仍未得到充分评估。在这项研究中,我们使用了一种半定量方法,涉及国家和国际专家,来评估从野猪向国内养猪场引入 ASF 的不同传播途径以及在比利时流行病学背景下养猪场之间传播的风险。通过我们的问卷获得的定性回答被数值化并进行了统计处理,以对危害发生的可能性进行半定量评估,并对所有传播途径进行排名。“农民”、“垫料”、“兽医”和“养猪业专业人员”被认为是 ASF 从野生动物宿主引入养猪场的最重要的传播途径。“动物运动”、“农民”、“兽医”、“医源性”、“动物运输卡车”和“动物护理设备”被认为是 ASF 在养猪场之间传播的最重要的传播途径。结合养猪场的具体生物安全检查,这种评估有助于确定针对 ASF 引入和在国内养猪业进一步传播的风险缓解措施的优先级,特别是在西欧 ASF 形势恶化的情况下。