School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.
Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.
PLoS One. 2021 Apr 1;16(4):e0237282. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0237282. eCollection 2021.
The neural representation of a 'biological self' is linked theoretically to the control of bodily physiology. In an influential model, selfhood relates to internal agency and higher-order interoceptive representation, inferred from the predicted impact of efferent autonomic nervous activity on afferent viscerosensory feedback. Here we tested if an altered representation of physical self (illusory embodiment of an artificial hand) is accompanied by sustained shifts in autonomic activity. Participants (N = 37) underwent procedures for induction of the rubber hand illusion (synchronous stroking of own unseen hand and observed stroking of artificial hand) and a control condition (asychronous stroking). We recorded electrocardiography, electrodermal activity, and a non-invasive measure of multiunit skin sympathetic nerve activity (SKNA) from the chest. We compared these autonomic indices between task conditions, and between individuals who did and did not experience the illusion. Bayes factors quantified the strength of evidence for and against null hypotheses. Observed proprioceptive drift and subjective reports confirmed the efficacy of the synchronous (vs asynchronous) condition in inducing illusory hand ownership. Stringent discriminant analysis classified 24/37 individuals as experiencing the rubber hand illusion. Surprisingly, heart rate, heart rate variability, electrodermal activity, and SKNA measures revealed no autonomic differences between synchronous vs asynchronous conditions, nor between individuals who did or did not experience the rubber hand illusion. Bayes factors indicated substantial evidence for no physiological differences. In contrast to earlier reports, our autonomic data show the absence of a reliable change in physiological state during the rubber hand illusion. More encompassing perturbations of self-experience, for example in full body illusions, may nevertheless be coupled to, or facilitated by, changes in efferent autonomic activity and afferent viscerosensory feedback. Our findings suggest that such changes in bodily physiology are not sustained as an obligatory component of the rubber hand illusion.
“生物自我”的神经表现理论上与躯体生理学的控制有关。在一个有影响力的模型中,自我与内部能动性和更高阶的内脏感觉代表有关,这是从传出自主神经活动对传入内脏感觉反馈的预测影响中推断出来的。在这里,我们测试了身体自我(人工手的错觉体现)的代表是否会伴随着自主活动的持续变化。参与者(N=37)接受了橡胶手错觉诱导程序(自己看不见的手与观察到的手同步抚摸)和对照条件(异步抚摸)。我们记录了心电图、皮肤电活动和胸部非侵入性多单位皮肤交感神经活动(SKNA)。我们比较了这些自主指数在任务条件之间,以及在经历和不经历错觉的个体之间的差异。贝叶斯因子量化了对零假设的支持和反对的证据强度。观察到的本体感觉漂移和主观报告证实了同步(与异步)条件在诱导错觉手所有权方面的有效性。严格的判别分析将 24/37 名个体分类为经历了橡胶手错觉。令人惊讶的是,心率、心率变异性、皮肤电活动和 SKNA 测量值在同步与异步条件之间,以及在经历和不经历橡胶手错觉的个体之间,均未显示出自主差异。贝叶斯因子表明没有生理差异的证据很大。与早期的报告相反,我们的自主数据显示,在橡胶手错觉期间,生理状态没有可靠的变化。更全面的自我体验的干扰,例如在全身错觉中,可能仍然与传出自主活动和传入内脏感觉反馈的变化相关联或促进。我们的发现表明,作为橡胶手错觉的一个强制性组成部分,这种身体生理学的变化不会持续存在。