Business School, Jiangsu Normal University, Xuzhou 221116, China.
School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2021 Mar 25;18(7):3405. doi: 10.3390/ijerph18073405.
In reverse green supply chain, the mixed collection channel strategy of green remanufacturer is analyzed by building a dynamic game model in which we consider that the green remanufacturer undertakes the environmental responsibility and the green collector shows strong fairness concern for the profit. We analyze the impact of the environmental responsibility level of the green remanufacturer, the preference coefficient of the green remanufacturer, the fairness concern coefficient of the green collector, and the coefficient of cross collection price on optimal decision and profit of the green remanufacturer. The result shows that (1) the green remanufacturer can further improve the collection price, so that it makes many more customers participate in the collection activity; (2) the green remanufacturer pays more attention to fulfill the environmental responsibility, which will increase the intensity of collection of the waste green product, and improve the collection price, as the old green product's remanufacturing cost is lower than the production cost of the new product, and it can improve the green remanufacturer's profits; (3) the green remanufacturer's profit in the mixed collection channel is higher than those in online or offline collection channels.
在逆向绿色供应链中,通过构建一个动态博弈模型,分析了绿色再制造商的混合收集渠道策略,其中我们考虑绿色再制造商承担环境责任,绿色收集商对利润表现出强烈的公平关切。我们分析了绿色再制造商的环境责任水平、绿色再制造商的偏好系数、绿色收集商的公平关切系数和交叉收集价格系数对绿色再制造商最优决策和利润的影响。结果表明:(1)绿色再制造商可以进一步提高收集价格,从而使更多的客户参与收集活动;(2)绿色再制造商更加注重履行环境责任,这将增加废旧绿色产品的收集力度,提高收集价格,因为旧绿色产品的再制造成本低于新产品的生产成本,从而提高绿色再制造商的利润;(3)混合收集渠道中绿色再制造商的利润高于在线或离线收集渠道。