Tian Gang, Zhang Yaru, Tian Ruoxi, Gong Yu, Sun Huaping, Li Liang, Geng Shaoqing
School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, 212013, China.
Southampton Business School, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2023 Jan;30(2):4792-4811. doi: 10.1007/s11356-022-22497-9. Epub 2022 Aug 17.
Due to limited resources and meager profits, collectors have insufficient motivation to fulfill their responsibilities, resulting in severe secondary pollution in the recycling process. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the interests of collectors to motivate them to fulfill their solid waste management (SWM) responsibilities better. This paper focuses on remanufacturers' altruistic behavior in the context of collectors' compliance. Based on the Stackelberg game method, this paper constructs decision-making models for remanufacturers concerned or not concerned about the interests of collectors and compares the optimal decision-making outcomes of each model. The study finds that (1) based on remanufacturers' altruistic concerns, a coordination mechanism for sharing responsibility-fulfilling costs for collectors can motivate them to fulfill their responsibilities and improve the performance of the remanufacturing supply chain. (2) The proportion of the remanufacturer's share of the responsibility cost for the collector should not be too low, which is not conducive to encouraging the collector to fulfill the responsibility. However, the sharing proportion should not be too high, as this will increase the burden on the remanufacturer. This paper demonstrates the applicability of remanufacturers to moderately share responsibility costs for collectors to incentivize collectors to fulfill their responsibilities. The findings bridge the gap in research on SWM in remanufacturing supply chains. The management insights from this paper are expected to help remanufacturing supply chain companies establish a reuse behavior model that addresses the challenges that SWM faces to improve remanufacturing supply chain performance.
由于资源有限且利润微薄，回收者履行职责的积极性不足，导致回收过程中产生严重的二次污染。因此，有必要关注回收者的利益，以激励他们更好地履行其固体废物管理（SWM）职责。本文聚焦于回收者合规背景下再制造商的利他行为。基于斯塔克尔伯格博弈方法，构建了关注或不关注回收者利益的再制造商决策模型，并比较了各模型的最优决策结果。研究发现：（1）基于再制造商的利他关切，一种为回收者分担履行成本的协调机制能够激励他们履行职责，并提升再制造供应链的绩效。（2）再制造商为回收者分担责任成本的比例不宜过低，这不利于激励回收者履行职责。然而，分担比例也不宜过高，因为这会增加再制造商的负担。本文论证了再制造商适度为回收者分担责任成本以激励回收者履行职责的适用性。研究结果填补了再制造供应链中SWM研究的空白。本文的管理见解有望帮助再制造供应链企业建立一种应对SWM所面临挑战的再利用行为模式，以提升再制造供应链绩效。
