Peters Uwe, Nottelmann Nikolaj
Center for Science and Thought, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany.
Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
Synthese. 2021;199(3-4):7231-7253. doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03111-w. Epub 2021 Mar 27.
'No-platforming'-the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view(s)-is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent epistemic arguments in favor of no-platforming fail to factor these considerations in and, as a result, offer neither a conclusive justification nor strong epistemic support for no-platforming in any of the relevant cases. Moreover, we argue that, taken together, our epistemic considerations against no-platforming and the three arguments for the policy suggest that no-platforming poses an epistemic dilemma (i.e., a difficult choice situation involving two equally undesirable options). While advocates and opponents of no-platforming alike have so far overlooked this dilemma, it should be addressed not only to prevent that actual no-platforming decisions create more epistemic harm than good, but also to put us into a better position to justify the policy when it is indeed warranted.
“禁止发声”——即因某人观点被认为令人憎恶或误入歧途而拒绝其在某些场合表达意见的做法——是一个热门话题。几位哲学家提出了在某些情况下采用该政策的认识论理由。在此，我们引入与所讨论的案例反思相关的、反对“禁止发声”的认识论考量。然后我们认为，最近支持“禁止发声”的三个认识论论证未能将这些考量因素纳入其中，因此，在任何相关案例中，既没有为“禁止发声”提供决定性的正当理由，也没有提供有力的认识论支持。此外，我们认为，我们反对“禁止发声”的认识论考量与支持该政策的三个论证合在一起表明，“禁止发声”构成了一种认识论困境（即一种涉及两个同样不可取选项的艰难选择情形）。虽然“禁止发声”的支持者和反对者迄今都忽略了这一困境，但不仅应解决这一困境以防止实际的“禁止发声”决定造成的认知危害多于益处，而且还应使我们在该政策确实有正当理由时，能更好地为其辩护。
