Peters Uwe
Center for Science and Thought, University of Bonn, Am Hof 1, 53113 Bonn, Germany.
Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
Eur J Philos Sci. 2021;11(1):33. doi: 10.1007/s13194-021-00349-6. Epub 2021 Mar 3.
Demographic diversity might often be present in a group without group members noticing it. What are the epistemic effects if they do? Several philosophers and social scientists have recently argued that when individuals detect demographic diversity in their group, this can result in epistemic benefits even if that diversity doesn't involve cognitive differences. Here I critically discuss research advocating this proposal, introduce a distinction between two types of detection of demographic diversity, and apply this distinction to the theorizing on diversity in science. Focusing on 'invisible' diversity (i.e., differences in, e.g., LGBTQ+, religious, or political orientation), I argue that in one common kind of group in science, if group members have full insight into their group's diversity, this is likely to create epistemic costs. These costs can be avoided and epistemic benefits gained if group members only partly detect their group's diversity. There is thus an epistemic reason for context-dependent limitations on scientists' insight into the diversity of their group.
人口统计学上的多样性可能经常存在于一个群体中，而群体成员却没有注意到。如果他们注意到了，会产生哪些认知影响呢？最近，几位哲学家和社会科学家认为，当个体察觉到他们所在群体中的人口统计学多样性时，即使这种多样性并不涉及认知差异，也可能带来认知益处。在此，我批判性地讨论支持这一观点的研究，引入两种对人口统计学多样性察觉的区分，并将这种区分应用于科学领域的多样性理论研究。聚焦于“无形”的多样性（例如 LGBTQ+、宗教或政治取向方面的差异），我认为在科学领域的一种常见群体中，如果群体成员充分洞察到他们群体的多样性，这很可能会产生认知成本。如果群体成员只是部分察觉到他们群体的多样性，那么这些成本是可以避免的，并且能获得认知益处。因此，存在一个认知方面的理由，要求对科学家洞察其群体多样性的程度进行依情境而定的限制。
