Centro de Investigación en Complejidad Social (CICS), Facultad de Gobierno, Universidad del Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile.
Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California, USA.
Conserv Biol. 2021 Dec;35(6):1913-1922. doi: 10.1111/cobi.13758. Epub 2021 Jun 21.
Governance regimes that assign exclusive access to support collective action are increasingly promoted to manage common-pool resources under the premise that they foster environmental stewardship. However, experimental evidence linked to existing policies that support this premise is lacking. Overlapping access policies in small-scale fisheries provide a unique opportunity to test the effects of access regimes on users' stewardship behaviors. We performed a lab-in-the-field experiment to assess how fishers' previous experience with access regimes relates to compliance and peer enforcement (n = 120). Fishers' compliance and peer-enforcement decisions were compared in a common-pool-resource game. Treatments differed in framing to represent exclusive access and pseudo-open access regimes, both of which fishers face in real life. To contrast behavior in the game with real-life observations, we compared fishers' associations that have shown relatively high and low management performance under exclusive access policies. Compliance and peer enforcement were higher under the exclusive access treatment than under the pseudo-open access treatment only for fishers' associations with high management performance in real life. Behaviors in the game reflected differences between associations in real life. Our results support previous research on ocean governance by experimentally assessing the role of access regimes in determining users' stewardship and suggest potential mechanisms for stewardship internalization.
治理制度被越来越多地推广用于管理公共池塘资源，这些制度赋予了支持集体行动的独家准入权，并假设它们可以促进环境管理。然而，缺乏与支持这一前提的现有政策相关的实验证据。小规模渔业中的重叠准入政策为测试准入制度对用户管理行为的影响提供了一个独特的机会。我们进行了一项实地实验室实验，以评估渔民以前的准入制度经验与合规性和同行执行（n = 120）之间的关系。在公共池塘资源博弈中比较了渔民的合规性和同行执行决策。处理方法在框架上有所不同，代表了排他性准入和伪开放准入制度，渔民在现实生活中都面临着这两种制度。为了将博弈中的行为与现实生活中的观察结果进行对比，我们比较了在排他性准入政策下表现出相对较高和较低管理绩效的渔民协会。只有在现实生活中管理绩效较高的渔民协会，排他性准入处理下的合规性和同行执行比伪开放准入处理下更高。博弈中的行为反映了现实生活中协会之间的差异。我们的研究结果通过实验评估准入制度在决定用户管理中的作用，支持了之前关于海洋治理的研究，并为管理内化提供了潜在机制。
