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大规模人类社会中的合作——如果有的话,是什么使其独一无二,它又是如何演变的?

Cooperation in large-scale human societies-What, if anything, makes it unique, and how did it evolve?

作者信息

Powers Simon T, van Schaik Carel P, Lehmann Laurent

机构信息

School of Computing, Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh, UK.

Department of Anthropology, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland.

出版信息

Evol Anthropol. 2021 Jul;30(4):280-293. doi: 10.1002/evan.21909. Epub 2021 Jun 4.

DOI:10.1002/evan.21909
PMID:34085349
Abstract

To resolve the major controversy about why prosocial behaviors persist in large-scale human societies, we propose that two questions need to be answered. First, how do social interactions in small-scale and large-scale societies differ? By reviewing the exchange and collective-action dilemmas in both small-scale and large-scale societies, we show they are not different. Second, are individual decision-making mechanisms driven by self-interest? We extract from the literature three types of individual decision-making mechanism, which differ in their social influence and sensitivity to self-interest, to conclude that humans interacting with non-relatives are largely driven by self-interest. We then ask: what was the key mechanism that allowed prosocial behaviors to continue as societies grew? We show the key role played by new social interaction mechanisms-change in the rules of exchange and collective-action dilemmas-devised by the interacting individuals, which allow for self-interested individuals to remain prosocial as societies grow.

摘要

为了解决关于亲社会行为为何在大规模人类社会中持续存在的重大争议,我们提出需要回答两个问题。第一,小规模社会和大规模社会中的社会互动有何不同?通过回顾小规模社会和大规模社会中的交换与集体行动困境,我们表明它们并无不同。第二,个体决策机制是否由自身利益驱动?我们从文献中提炼出三种个体决策机制,它们在社会影响和对自身利益的敏感度方面存在差异,得出与非亲属互动的人类很大程度上受自身利益驱动的结论。然后我们提出问题:随着社会的发展,使亲社会行为得以延续的关键机制是什么?我们展示了由互动个体设计的新社会互动机制——交换规则和集体行动困境的变化——所发挥的关键作用,这些机制使自利的个体在社会发展过程中仍能保持亲社会行为。

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