Lyles School of Civil Engineering, Purdue University, 550 Stadium Mall Dr., W. Lafayette, IN 47907, United States.
Accid Anal Prev. 2021 Sep;159:106254. doi: 10.1016/j.aap.2021.106254. Epub 2021 Jun 18.
At "semi-controlled" crosswalks with yield signs and markings, negotiations as to the right-of-way occur frequently between pedestrians and motorists, to determine who should proceed first. This kind of "negotiation" often leads to traffic delay and potential conflicts. To minimize misunderstandings between pedestrian and motorist that can have serious safety consequences, it is essential that we understand the decision-making process as the "players" interact in real street-crossing situations. This paper employs a game-theoretic approach to investigate the joint behaviors of pedestrians and motorists from the perspective of safety. Assuming bounded rationality for each player, the quantal response equilibrium is a special kind of game with incomplete information. Explanatory variables such as conflicting risks and time savings can be incorporated into the payoff functions of the "players" via expected utility functions. Finally, model parameters can be estimated using an expectation maximization algorithm. The game-theoretic framework is applied to model pedestrian-motorist interactions at a semi-controlled crosswalk on a university campus. The estimation results indicate that the likelihood of pedestrian-vehicle conflict can be quantified. The results can lead to control measures that facilitate the negotiation between pedestrian and motorist and reduce the conflict risk at semi-controlled crosswalks.
在设有让行标志和标线的“半控制”人行横道上，行人和驾驶员经常就先行权进行协商，以确定谁应先行。这种“协商”往往会导致交通延误和潜在冲突。为了最大限度地减少行人和驾驶员之间可能产生严重安全后果的误解，我们必须了解“参与者”在真实的过街情况下相互作用的决策过程。本文从安全角度出发，采用博弈论方法研究行人和驾驶员的联合行为。假设每个参与者都是有限理性的，量子对策均衡是一种具有不完全信息的特殊博弈。通过期望效用函数，可以将冲突风险和节省时间等解释变量纳入“参与者”的收益函数中。最后，可以使用期望最大化算法估计模型参数。博弈论框架用于在大学校园的半控制人行横道上模拟行人和驾驶员的相互作用。估计结果表明，可以量化行人和车辆冲突的可能性。研究结果可以为促进行人和驾驶员之间的协商以及减少半控制人行横道的冲突风险提供控制措施。
