Namkoong G, Regan T
USDA Forest Service, North Carolina State University, Raleigh 27695-7614.
J Med Philos. 1988 May;13(2):213-21. doi: 10.1093/jmp/13.2.213.
An argument for denying moral rights to nonhuman species is that beliefs, desires, and interests are inherent in the normal human capacity for speech and, since only humans are linguistically capable, only humans can have rights. We argue that linguistics and many conceptual abilities are ontogenetically independent in humans and that various morally relevant mental capacities can exist independently. We also then argue that phylogenetic independence is also possible and hence, that the concept of an inherent dependence of moral standing on having linguistic capabilities is insufficient for denying rights to nonhumans.
一种反对赋予非人类物种道德权利的观点认为，信念、欲望和利益是人类正常语言能力所固有的，而且由于只有人类具备语言能力，所以只有人类才能拥有权利。我们认为，语言能力和许多概念能力在人类个体发育过程中是相互独立的，而且各种与道德相关的心理能力也可以独立存在。我们还进而认为，系统发育上的独立性也是可能的，因此，认为道德地位必然依赖于拥有语言能力的观点不足以剥夺非人类的权利。
