Sapontzis S F
Department of Philosophy, California State University, Hayward 94542.
J Med Philos. 1988 May;13(2):177-96. doi: 10.1093/jmp/13.2.177.
In research employing animals we commonly do things to them which would be grossly immoral to do to humans. This paper discusses three possible justifications for so treating animals: (a) it is violating the autonomy of rational beings which makes actions immoral, and animals are not autonomous; (b) due to our participation in the human community, we have special obligations to humans that we do not have to animals; and (c) human life is morally more worthy than animal life. The conclusion of this discussion is that none of these three propositions justifies the routine sacrifice of animal interests for human benefit. Particular attention is paid to the idea that human life is morally more worthy than animal life, because I believe that to be the most common justification for our sacrifice of animal interests in research. The claim of greater worth is considered and criticized from both utilitarian and Kantian perspectives, and the inference from superior worth to being entitled to exploit one's inferiors is also criticized. The paper concludes by recommending a governing principle for research with animals which would bring that research into line with the rejection of hierarchical worldviews, social orders, and value systems which characterizes modern moral progress.
在利用动物进行的研究中，我们通常会对它们做一些事情，而这些事情要是对人类做的话就会是极其不道德的。本文讨论了如此对待动物的三种可能的正当理由：（a）这侵犯了理性生物的自主性，而正是这种自主性使得行为不道德，而动物没有自主性；（b）由于我们身处人类社会，我们对人类负有特殊义务，而对动物则没有；（c）人类生命在道德上比动物生命更有价值。本次讨论的结论是，这三个命题中没有一个能为为了人类利益而例行牺牲动物利益的行为提供正当理由。我们特别关注人类生命在道德上比动物生命更有价值这一观点，因为我认为这是我们在研究中牺牲动物利益最常见的正当理由。从功利主义和康德主义的角度对更高价值的主张进行了考量和批判，同时也批判了从更高价值推断出有权剥削低等者的观点。本文最后推荐了一项动物研究的指导原则，该原则将使这种研究与摒弃等级世界观、社会秩序和价值体系保持一致，而这正是现代道德进步的特征。
