Department of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia.
Laboratory for Research of Individual Differences, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia.
Int J Psychol. 2021 Dec;56(6):917-933. doi: 10.1002/ijop.12791. Epub 2021 Jul 1.
Although previous meta-analytic evidence supports the existence of parochialism in cooperation among adults, the extent to which children and adolescents are more willing to incur a personal cost to benefit ingroups, compared to outgroups, is not yet clear. We provide the first meta-analysis on the existence and magnitude of parochialism in cooperation among pre-adults. Based on 20 experimental economics studies (k = 69, N = 5268, age = 3-19, 12 countries, published 2008-2019), a multilevel meta-analytic model revealed a small overall effect size indicating that children and adolescents were more cooperative towards ingroups (d = 0.22, 95% CI [0.07, 0.38]). A series of single-moderator analyses tested for the following conditions: participant age and sex; game type ([mini-]dictator game, prisoner's dilemma, public goods dilemma, trust game, ultimatum game); outcome interdependence; membership manipulation (between- vs. within-subjects); group type (natural vs. experimental); reward type (monetary vs. non-monetary); and country of the participant. Parochial cooperation did not vary with participants' age. Parochialism was larger in non-interdependent (dictator-type) compared to interdependent (bargaining and social dilemma) games. There were no moderating effects of group type, membership manipulation or reward type. To provide more data on how parochialism develops, primary studies should report age ranges more precisely and use more restricted age groups.
虽然先前的荟萃分析证据支持成年人之间合作中存在偏狭性，但儿童和青少年与外群体相比，更愿意为自身群体利益付出个人代价的程度尚不清楚。我们首次对未成年合作中偏狭性的存在和程度进行了荟萃分析。基于 20 项实验经济学研究（k=69，N=5268，年龄=3-19 岁，12 个国家，发表于 2008-2019 年），一个多层次元分析模型揭示了一个小的总体效应大小，表明儿童和青少年对自身群体更具合作性（d=0.22，95%置信区间[0.07，0.38]）。一系列单变量分析检验了以下条件：参与者年龄和性别；游戏类型（迷你-独裁游戏、囚徒困境、公共物品困境、信任游戏、最后通牒游戏）；结果相互依存性；成员操纵（组间与组内）；群体类型（自然与实验）；奖励类型（货币与非货币）；以及参与者所在的国家。偏狭合作与参与者的年龄无关。在非相互依存（独裁）型游戏中，偏狭性大于相互依存（谈判和社会困境）型游戏。群体类型、成员操纵或奖励类型没有调节作用。为了提供更多关于偏狭性如何发展的信息，初级研究应更精确地报告年龄范围，并使用更受限制的年龄组。
