Yi Richard, Johnson Matthew W, Bickel Warren K
University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont, USA.
Learn Behav. 2005 Aug;33(3):324-36. doi: 10.3758/bf03192861.
A number of authors have proposed that preference for a larger, delayed reward in delay discounting is similar to cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game versus tit-for-tat. This proposal was examined by correlating delay-discounting (Experiment 1) and probability-discounting (Experiment 2) rates for hypothetical monetary gains and losses with performance in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Correlations between rate of delay discounting (discounting parameters and area under the curve) and proportion of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game versus tit-for-tat were significant across three magnitudes, and correlations were generally higher with discounting for losses than with that for gains. As was expected, correlations between rate of delay discounting and performance versus a random strategy in the prisoner's dilemma game were not significant. Correlations between rate of probability-discounting and cooperation rate in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game versus neither a tit-for-tat nor a random strategy were significant.
一些作者提出，在延迟折扣中对更大的延迟奖励的偏好类似于重复囚徒困境博弈中与针锋相对策略相对的合作。通过将假设货币收益和损失的延迟折扣率（实验1）和概率折扣率（实验2）与重复囚徒困境博弈中的表现进行关联，对这一观点进行了检验。延迟折扣率（折扣参数和曲线下面积）与重复囚徒困境博弈中针锋相对策略下的合作比例之间的相关性在三个量级上都很显著，并且通常损失折扣的相关性高于收益折扣的相关性。正如预期的那样，延迟折扣率与囚徒困境博弈中与随机策略相对的表现之间的相关性不显著。概率折扣率与重复囚徒困境博弈中既非针锋相对策略也非随机策略下的合作率之间的相关性显著。
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