Kornblit A
Acta Psiquiatr Psicol Am Lat. 1987 Jun;33(2):112-22.
In this paper, the author describes the jump of paradigm in Human Sciences the conceptual model introduced by G. Bateson implies inasmuch as it shifts emphasis from the analysis of facts to formal organization of reality, and defines 'mental' as a concept which comprehends an organism with relation to its surroundings. The author reviews the main ideas Bateson extracted from both the systems theory and cybernetics in order to outline his 'ecology of human mind'. The complexity of psychosocial processes, however, requires no such mechanical models--i.e. 'less mechanical' ones--to explain time as a continuum in which changes in human systems occur, for instance. Thus, systems dynamics and recursivity models including a multiplicity of feedback loops contribute with some useful constructs. Finally, some ideas developed within 'hard sciences', applied to Social Sciences to integrate the complexity of the goals are also discussed.
在本文中，作者描述了人文科学中范式的转变，G. 贝特森引入的概念模型意味着这种转变，因为它将重点从事实分析转向现实的形式组织，并将“心智”定义为一个包含有机体与其周围环境关系的概念。作者回顾了贝特森从系统理论和控制论中提取的主要思想，以勾勒他的“人类心智生态学”。然而，心理社会过程的复杂性并不需要这样的机械模型——即“不那么机械的”模型——来解释时间作为一个连续体，例如人类系统在其中发生变化。因此，包括多个反馈回路的系统动力学和递归模型提供了一些有用的结构。最后，还讨论了“硬科学”中发展出来的一些思想，这些思想应用于社会科学以整合目标的复杂性。
