Schutter Manon, van Dijk Eric, de Kwaadsteniet Erik W, van Dijk Wilco W
Social, Economic and Organisational Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands.
Knowledge Centre Psychology and Economic Behaviour, Leiden, Netherlands.
Front Psychol. 2021 Jul 7;12:643174. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.643174. eCollection 2021.
In two experimental studies, we investigated the affective (Studies 1 and 2) and behavioral (Study 2) effects of not being trusted. In an adapted version of the Trust Game paradigm, participants were all assigned the position of Person B, and learned that their opponent (Person A) had decided to not let them divide monetary outcomes. This had either been an inactive decision (Person A had not offered them the option to distribute outcomes) or an active decision (Person A had taken away their option to distribute outcomes). Results of both studies reveal that reactions to not being trusted were significantly affected by whether this decision was active or inactive. Active decisions evoked a more negative evaluation toward Person A, led participants to experience more negative emotions, and lowered their satisfaction with the final outcome, even though payoffs and final earnings were held constant between the conditions (Study 1). In addition, when the decision not to trust had been an active decision, participants subsequently behaved less altruistic, as evidenced by significant lower allocations in a subsequent Dictator Game (Study 2). Interestingly, this reduction in altruism was not restricted to encounters with Person A, but also extended to an uninvolved other (Person C).
在两项实验研究中,我们调查了不被信任所产生的情感影响(研究1和研究2)以及行为影响(研究2)。在信任博弈范式的一个改编版本中,所有参与者都被分配为乙的角色,并得知他们的对手(甲)决定不让他们来分配金钱结果。这要么是一个消极的决定(甲没有给他们分配结果的选择权),要么是一个积极的决定(甲剥夺了他们分配结果的选择权)。两项研究的结果都表明,对不被信任的反应会因这个决定是积极的还是消极的而受到显著影响。积极的决定会引发对甲更负面的评价,导致参与者体验到更多的负面情绪,并降低他们对最终结果的满意度,尽管在不同条件下收益和最终收入是恒定的(研究1)。此外,当不信任的决定是一个积极的决定时,参与者随后的行为会变得不那么利他,这在随后的独裁者博弈中分配显著减少得到了证明(研究2)。有趣的是,这种利他行为的减少并不局限于与甲的互动,还延伸到了一个不相关的他人(丙)身上。