Wu Junhui, Balliet Daniel, Kou Yu, Van Lange Paul A M
Beijing Key Laboratory of Applied Experimental Psychology, National Demonstration Center for Experimental Psychology Education, Institute of Developmental Psychology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China.
Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Front Psychol. 2019 Mar 28;10:651. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00651. eCollection 2019.
In this research, we examine how cooperation emerges and develops in sequential dyadic interactions when the initial interaction varies in strategic considerations (i.e., fear of partner rejection) or potential gossip by one's partner that may affect subsequent interactions. In a lab experiment involving real-time interactions ( = 240) across 39 sessions, participants acted in different roles (i.e., Person A, B, and C) in two different games-Person A was first assigned to allocate an amount of resource to Person B in a dictator game or an ultimatum game. Afterward, Person C interacted with Person A (i.e., trustee) as a trustor in a trust game. Prior to their decisions, participants (a) learned that Person B could gossip by sending evaluations about Person A's behavior to Person C prior to the trust game or (b) did not receive this information. Findings replicate previous research showing that potential gossip by one's partner greatly increases cooperation that is revealed in the resources allocated to the partner. Yet, compared to the dictator game, the presence of strategic considerations in the ultimatum game does not significantly enhance cooperation, and even makes people less likely to reciprocate others' behavior in the subsequent interaction. Interestingly, when there is no gossip, those who have played the ultimatum game, compared to the dictator game, are more trusted by others but do not vary in reciprocity in the subsequent interaction. However, when there is gossip, those who have played the dictator game, compared to the ultimatum game, are more trusted and also more likely to reciprocate others' behavior in the subsequent interaction. These findings imply that gossip invariably promotes cooperation across strategic and non-strategic situations, but the potential rejection by one's partner weakly promotes cooperation, and even undermines future cooperation especially when paired with reputation sharing opportunities. We discuss the implications of these findings for implementing reputation systems that can promote and maintain cooperation cost-effectively.
在本研究中，我们考察了在顺序二元互动中，当初始互动在战略考量（即对伙伴拒绝的恐惧）或伙伴可能影响后续互动的潜在流言方面存在差异时，合作是如何出现和发展的。在一项涉及39个场次的实时互动（N = 240）的实验室实验中，参与者在两个不同的游戏中扮演不同的角色（即A、B和C）——在独裁者游戏或最后通牒游戏中，A首先被分配向B分配一定数量的资源。之后，C作为信任者在信任游戏中与A（即受托人）互动。在做出决定之前，参与者（a）得知B可以在信任游戏之前向C发送关于A行为的评价进行流言传播，或者（b）没有收到此信息。研究结果重复了先前的研究，表明伙伴的潜在流言极大地增加了分配给伙伴的资源中所显示的合作。然而，与独裁者游戏相比，最后通牒游戏中战略考量的存在并没有显著增强合作效果，甚至使人们在后续互动中更不太可能回报他人的行为。有趣的是，当没有流言时，与独裁者游戏相比，玩过最后通牒游戏的人在后续互动中更被他人信任，但在回报方面没有差异。然而，当存在流言时，与最后通牒游戏相比时，玩过独裁者游戏的人更被他人信任，并且在后续互动中也更有可能回报他人的行为。这些发现意味着，流言在战略和非战略情况下都始终促进合作，但伙伴的潜在拒绝微弱地促进合作，甚至会破坏未来的合作，尤其是当与声誉分享机会相结合时。我们讨论了这些发现对于实施能够经济高效地促进和维持合作的声誉系统的意义。
