Gomis Benoît, Gallagher Allen William Andrew, Rowell Andy, Gilmore Anna B
Former consultant, Tobacco Control Research Group, University of Bath, Bath, UK.
Tobacco Control Research Group, Department for Health, University of Bath, Bath, UK
Tob Control. 2022 Jan;31(1):40-49. doi: 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2020-055837. Epub 2021 Sep 16.
Previous research has outlined transnational tobacco company (TTC) efforts to undermine implementation of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol) and evidence of ongoing TTC complicity in the illicit tobacco trade (ITT). However, the industry's views on the Protocol and role in its development are not well understood.
Systematic searching and analysis of leaked documents-approximately 15 000 from British American Tobacco (BAT) and 35 from Philip Morris International, triangulated via searches of online resources and interviews with five stakeholders across academia, international organisations, governments, civil society and the private sector.
Evidence indicates that after privately viewing the Protocol as a significant threat (2003), BAT worked to influence its content, while publicly signalling support for it (2007-2012), and was largely satisfied with the final text. BAT successfully pushed for a non-prescriptive text which enabled further country-level TTC influence during the Protocol's implementation phase. The final text also reflected other BAT policy preferences, including preventing outright bans on duty-free sales and intermingling, and making it difficult to sanction and hold tobacco companies accountable for ongoing involvement in the ITT. TTC representatives were present during early Protocol negotiations, despite rules against this, and BAT obtained draft texts before they were public and paid at least one delegate to support its position.
BAT's primary interest in shaping the Protocol was to minimise its financial and legal costs for BAT while maximising potential costs to small competitors. These findings raise concern about the Protocol's ability to control the ITT, particularly given TTCs' intention to influence ongoing national implementation. An effective Protocol is vital to controlling both the ITT and ongoing tobacco industry involvement in it and, in turn, governments' ability to increase tobacco taxes and thereby save lives.
此前的研究概述了跨国烟草公司（TTC）为破坏《消除烟草制品非法贸易议定书》（《议定书》）的实施所做的努力，以及TTC持续参与非法烟草贸易（ITT）的证据。然而，业界对《议定书》的看法及其在《议定书》制定过程中所起的作用尚不清楚。
对泄露文件进行系统检索和分析——约15000份来自英美烟草集团（BAT），35份来自菲利普·莫里斯国际公司，通过在线资源检索和对学术界、国际组织、政府、民间社会和私营部门的五名利益相关者进行访谈进行三角验证。
有证据表明，在私下将《议定书》视为重大威胁（2003年）之后，英美烟草集团努力影响其内容，同时在公开场合表示支持（2007 - 2012年），并对最终文本大体满意。英美烟草集团成功推动了一个非规范性文本的形成，这使得烟草公司在《议定书》实施阶段能够在国家层面施加进一步影响。最终文本还反映了英美烟草集团的其他政策偏好，包括阻止对免税销售和混合销售的全面禁令，以及使得制裁烟草公司并追究其持续参与非法烟草贸易的责任变得困难。尽管有相关规定禁止，但烟草公司代表在《议定书》早期谈判期间就已到场，英美烟草集团在文本公开之前就获取了草案文本，并且至少向一名代表付费以支持其立场。
英美烟草集团塑造《议定书》的主要利益在于将其自身的财务和法律成本降至最低，同时将对小型竞争对手的潜在成本最大化。这些发现引发了对《议定书》控制非法烟草贸易能力的担忧，特别是考虑到烟草公司有意影响各国正在进行的实施工作。一项有效的《议定书》对于控制非法烟草贸易以及烟草行业对其的持续参与至关重要，进而对于政府提高烟草税从而挽救生命的能力也至关重要。
