Faculty of Health Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Blusson Hall, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada.
Department of Management & International Business, College of Business, Florida International University, Modesto A. Maidique Campus, 11200 S.W. 8th St, MANGO 425, Miami, FL, 33199, USA.
Global Health. 2018 Nov 19;14(1):110. doi: 10.1186/s12992-018-0412-3.
Leading transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) began to expand their operations in Latin America in the 1960s. This included legally exporting their cigarettes to Paraguay during the 1960s which, in turn, were illegally re-exported to Argentina and Brazil. By the 1990s, competition between BAT and PMI for this lucrative illicit market, focusing on low-priced brands, prompted manufacturing in Paraguay. Paraguayan manufacturing rapidly grew after the introduction of a new cigarette export tax in Brazil in 1999.
We systematically searched Truth Tobacco Industry Documents (TTID) to understand the activities and strategies of leading TTCs in Paraguay and subregion over time. We applied the analytical framework of Lee and Eckhardt (2017) to understand Tabesa's global business strategy. We searched the websites of TTCs and Tabesa for activities since the mid 2000s to understand how the companies publicly describe these strategies. We used the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) as an independent source to crosscheck statements by Tabesa executives about export markets. We contextualized and triangulated our findings with 42 key informant interviews.
Tabesa became the largest cigarette manufacturer in Paraguay, and one of the largest companies in the country, through complicity in the illicit trade. Enabled by market conditions created by leading TTCs, and a permissive regulatory environment in Paraguay, evidence suggests Tabesa had become a major source of illicit cigarettes across Latin America and beyond by the late 2000s. Although Brazil continues to account for the bulk of Tabesa's revenues, findings suggest that the company is aspiring to compete with TTCs in markets worldwide through legal and illegal sales.
There is a need for fuller understanding of the risks to global tobacco control from local companies aspiring to compete with TTCs. The rise of Tabesa is part of the changing nature of the illicit trade in tobacco products which must be taken into account in implementing the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and its Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. Potential conflicts of interest concerning Tabesa illustrate the importance of FCTC Article 5.3 on industry interference. There is also an urgent need to address the lack of independent and rigorous data on the illicit tobacco trade in the region.
20 世纪 60 年代，大型跨国烟草公司（TTCs）开始在拉丁美洲扩大业务。这包括在 20 世纪 60 年代将其香烟合法出口到巴拉圭，而这些香烟又被非法转口到阿根廷和巴西。到 20 世纪 90 年代，英美烟草公司（BAT）和菲利普莫里斯国际公司（PMI）为争夺这一利润丰厚的非法市场展开竞争，重点推出低价品牌，促使巴拉圭开始生产香烟。1999 年，巴西推出新的香烟出口税后，巴拉圭的香烟制造业迅速发展。
我们系统地搜索了真相烟草行业文件（TTID），以了解 TTCs 在过去一段时间内的活动和在巴拉圭及次区域的战略。我们应用了 Lee 和 Eckhardt（2017）的分析框架来理解 Tabesa 的全球商业战略。我们搜索了 TTCs 和 Tabesa 自 2000 年代中期以来的活动，以了解公司如何公开描述这些战略。我们使用联合国商品贸易统计数据库（UN Comtrade）作为独立来源，交叉核对 Tabesa 高管关于出口市场的陈述。我们用 42 次关键知情者访谈对我们的发现进行了背景和三角分析。
Tabesa 通过参与非法贸易，成为巴拉圭最大的香烟制造商，也是该国最大的公司之一。在 TTC 创造的市场条件和巴拉圭宽松的监管环境的推动下，有证据表明，到 2000 年代后期，Tabesa 已成为拉丁美洲及其他地区非法香烟的主要来源。尽管巴西仍是 Tabesa 大部分收入的来源地，但调查结果表明，该公司渴望通过合法和非法销售在全球市场与 TTCs 竞争。
需要更全面地了解有抱负的本地公司对全球烟草控制造成的风险。Tabesa 的崛起是烟草制品非法贸易性质变化的一部分，在实施《烟草控制框架公约》（FCTC）及其《消除烟草制品非法贸易议定书》时必须考虑到这一点。关于 Tabesa 的潜在利益冲突，说明了《公约》第 5.3 条关于行业干扰的重要性。此外，还迫切需要解决该地区缺乏关于非法烟草贸易的独立和严格数据的问题。
