Department of Radiation Oncology, Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Department of Radiation Oncology, Sidney Kimmel Cancer Center at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Pract Radiat Oncol. 2022 Mar-Apr;12(2):170-174. doi: 10.1016/j.prro.2021.09.011. Epub 2021 Oct 10.
The digitization of healthcare for patient safety and efficiency introduced third party networks into closed hospital systems increasing the probability of cyberattacks and their consequences(1). In April 2021, a major vendor of a Radiation Oncology (RO) record and verify system (RVS) suffered a ransomware attack, affecting our department and many others across the United States. This article summarizes our response to the ransomware event including workflows, team member roles, responsibilities, communications and departmental recovery. The RVS created or housed accurate patient dose records for 6 locations. The immediate response to the ransomware attack was to shut down the system including the ability to treat patients. With the utilization of the hospital EMR and pre-existing interfaces with RVS, the department was able to safely continue patient radiotherapy treatments innovatively utilizing a direct Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) transfer of patient data to the linear accelerators and implementing paper charting. No patients were treated in the first 24 hours of the attack. Within 48 hours of the ransomware event, 50% of patients were treated, and within 1 week, 95% of all patients were treated using direct DICOM transfer and paper charts. The RVS was completely unavailable for 2.5 weeks and full functionality was not restored for 4.5 weeks. A phased approach was adopted for re-introduction of patient treatments back into the RVS. Human capital costs included communication, outreach, workflow creation, quality assurance and extended clinical hours. Key lessons learned were to have a back-up of essential information, employ 'dry run' emergency training, having consistent parameter requirements across different vendor hardware and software, and having a plan for the recovery effort of restoring normal operations once software is operational. The provided report presents valuable information for the development of cyber-attack preparedness for RO departments.
为了提高患者安全性和效率而实现的医疗数字化,将第三方网络引入了封闭的医院系统,增加了网络攻击的可能性及其后果(1)。2021 年 4 月,一家主要的放射肿瘤学(RO)记录和验证系统(RVS)供应商遭受了勒索软件攻击,影响了我们部门和美国其他许多部门。本文总结了我们对勒索软件事件的应对措施,包括工作流程、团队成员角色、职责、沟通和部门恢复。该 RVS 为 6 个地点创建或存放了准确的患者剂量记录。对勒索软件攻击的直接反应是关闭系统,包括治疗患者的能力。通过利用医院的电子病历和与 RVS 预先存在的接口,该部门能够创新性地安全地继续为患者进行放射治疗,利用患者数据的直接数字成像和通信(DICOM)直接传输到直线加速器,并实施纸质图表。在攻击的头 24 小时内,没有为任何患者进行治疗。在勒索软件事件发生后的 48 小时内,有 50%的患者接受了治疗,在 1 周内,通过直接 DICOM 传输和纸质图表,95%的患者得到了治疗。RVS 完全无法使用了 2.5 周,完全恢复功能则用了 4.5 周。采用分阶段的方法重新将患者治疗引入 RVS。人力资本成本包括沟通、外展、工作流程创建、质量保证和延长临床时间。吸取的主要教训是备份关键信息、进行“模拟演练”紧急培训、在不同供应商的硬件和软件中保持一致的参数要求,以及在软件恢复正常运行后,为恢复正常运营制定恢复计划。本报告为 RO 部门制定网络攻击准备提供了有价值的信息。