Autonomous University of Barcelona, Cognitive Science and Language (CCiL), Edifici B, Campus de la UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, (Cerdanyola del Vallès), Spain.
Conscious Cogn. 2021 Oct;95:103216. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103216. Epub 2021 Oct 11.
A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented -just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.
认知科学和心智哲学的一个核心目标是区分感知和认知。表象论作为一种突出的候选理论，旨在做出这种区分。其观点是，感知和认知在信息的内容和呈现格式上存在差异——就像知觉表象在内容上是非概念的，在格式上是形象的，认知表象在内容上是概念的，在格式上是推理的。本文反对这种观点。我认为，感知和认知都可以使用概念和非概念的内容，并以形象和推理的格式进行传递。如果正确的话，那么将感知和认知区分开来的表象策略就失败了。
