Field Claire
Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK.
Acta Anal. 2021;36(3):423-441. doi: 10.1007/s12136-020-00450-0. Epub 2020 Sep 26.
I argue for the unexceptionality of evidence about what rationality requires. Specifically, I argue that, as for other topics, one's total evidence can sometimes support false beliefs about this. Despite being prima facie innocuous, a number of philosophers have recently denied this. Some have argued that the facts about what rationality requires are highly dependent on the agent's situation and change depending on what that situation is like (Bradley, , (3). 2019). Others have argued that a particular subset of normative truths, those concerning what epistemic rationality requires, have the special property of being 'fixed points'-it is impossible to have total evidence that supports false belief about them (Smithies, , 85(2). 2012; Titelbaum 2015). Each of these kinds of exceptionality permits a solution to downstream theoretical problems that arise from the possibility of evidence supporting false belief about requirements of rationality. However, as I argue here, they incur heavy explanatory burdens that we should avoid.
我主张关于理性要求的证据并无特殊之处。具体而言，我认为，与其他主题一样，一个人的全部证据有时可能支持关于此的错误信念。尽管乍一看并无危害，但最近有许多哲学家否认了这一点。一些人认为，关于理性要求的事实高度依赖于主体的情况，并会根据情况的不同而变化（布拉德利，（3），2019年）。另一些人则认为，规范性真理的一个特定子集，即那些关于认知理性要求的真理，具有“固定点”这一特殊属性——不可能有支持关于它们的错误信念的全部证据（史密斯ies，85（2），2012年；蒂特尔鲍姆，2015年）。这些特殊之处中的每一种都允许解决因证据支持关于理性要求的错误信念的可能性而产生的下游理论问题。然而，正如我在此所论证的，它们带来了我们应该避免的沉重解释负担。
