Health Services Research, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
Front Public Health. 2021 Nov 19;9:754861. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2021.754861. eCollection 2021.
Sweden's use of soft response measures early in the COVID-19 pandemic received a good deal of international attention. Within Sweden, one of the most debated aspects of the pandemic response has been and the time it took to increase testing capacity. In this article, the development of and the debate surrounding COVID-19 testing in Sweden during 2020 is described in detail, with a particular focus on the coordination between national and regional actors in the decentralised healthcare system. A qualitative case study was carried out based on qualitative document analysis with a chronological presentation. To understand COVID-19 testing in Sweden, two aspects of its public administration model emerged as particularly important: (i) the large and independent government agencies and (ii) self-governing regions and municipalities. In addition, the responsibility principle in Swedish crisis management was crucial. Overall, the results show that mass testing was a new area for coordination and involved a number of national and regional actors with partly different views on their respective roles, responsibilities and interpretations of the laws and regulations. The description shows the ambiguities in the purpose of testing and the shortcomings in communication and cooperation during the first half of 2020, but after that an increasing consistency among the crucial actors. During the first half of 2020, testing capacity in Sweden was limited and reserved to protect the most vulnerable in society. Because mass testing for viruses is not normally carried out by the 21 self-governing regions responsible for healthcare and communicable disease prevention, and the Public Health Agency of Sweden stated that there was to test members of the public falling ill with COVID-like symptoms, the responsibility for mass testing fell through the cracks during the first few months of the pandemic. This article thus illustrates problems associated with multi-level governance in healthcare during a crisis and illustrates the discrepancy between the health service's focus on the individual and the public health-oriented work carried out within communicable disease control.
瑞典在 COVID-19 大流行早期使用软性应对措施,引起了国际社会的广泛关注。在瑞典国内,大流行应对措施中最具争议的一个方面是增加检测能力的时间和方式。本文详细描述了 2020 年瑞典 COVID-19 检测的发展和围绕检测展开的辩论,特别关注分散式医疗体系中,国家和地区行为者之间的协调。本研究采用基于定性文献分析的定性案例研究方法,按时间顺序呈现。为了了解瑞典的 COVID-19 检测,公共行政模式的两个方面显得尤为重要:(i)庞大且独立的政府机构,(ii)自治的地区和市政当局。此外,瑞典危机管理中的责任原则至关重要。总体而言,研究结果表明,大规模检测是一个新的协调领域,涉及到许多国家和地区行为者,他们对各自的角色、责任以及对法律法规的理解存在部分差异。描述表明,检测目的存在模糊性,并且在 2020 年上半年沟通和合作方面存在缺陷,但此后关键行为者之间的一致性不断增强。2020 年上半年,瑞典的检测能力有限,主要用于保护社会中最脆弱的人群。由于通常情况下,21 个负责医疗保健和传染病预防的自治地区不会对出现 COVID 样症状的公众进行大规模检测,而瑞典公共卫生局表示,没有必要对出现 COVID 样症状的公众进行大规模检测,因此,在大流行的前几个月,大规模检测的责任存在漏洞。本文因此说明了在危机期间医疗保健中多层级治理存在的问题,并说明了卫生服务侧重于个体与传染病控制范围内开展的以公共卫生为导向的工作之间的差异。