Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK.
Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada N1G 2W1.
Proc Biol Sci. 2022 Jan 12;289(1966):20211773. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2021.1773.
Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.
第三方惩罚被认为是合作意图的诚实信号，当竞争选择成为合作伙伴时，这种信号可能会升级。在这里，我们研究了合作伙伴选择竞争是否会促使第三方惩罚的投资升级。我们还考虑了通过有益行为进行信号传递的情况，以直接检验这两种信号的相对强度。与投资不可见相比，个体在第三方帮助方面的投资多于第三方惩罚，并且在观察时对这两种信号的投资都更多。除了仅仅观察之外，我们没有发现合作伙伴选择对惩罚或帮助投资有明显的影响。与投资较少的第三方相比，投资较多的第三方更有可能在后续的信任博弈中被选为合作伙伴，尽管与惩罚相比，帮助条件下与更高投资者互动的偏好更为明显。投资较多的第三方被委托管理更多的钱，并且第三方惩罚或帮助的投资可靠地发出了值得信赖的信号。与没有投资第三方帮助的个体相比，没有投资第三方惩罚的个体更有可能不值得信任。这支持了惩罚作为合作意图的更模糊信号的概念，而不是帮助。
