Audi Robert
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN United States.
Ethical Theory Moral Pract. 2022;25(1):53-69. doi: 10.1007/s10677-021-10245-w. Epub 2022 Jan 7.
Moral judgment commonly depends on intuition. It is also true, though less widely agreed, that ethical theory depends on it. The nature and epistemic status of intuition have long been concerns of philosophy, and, with the increasing importance of ethical intuitionism as a major position in ethics, they are receiving much philosophical attention. There is growing agreement that intuition conceived as a kind of seeming is essential for both the justification of moral judgment and the confirmation of ethical theories. This paper describes several importantly different kinds of intuition, particularly the episodic kinds often called . This is done partly by sketching numerous examples of intuition. Intuitive seemings and moral judgments based on them differ in content, basis, epistemic authority, and phenomenology. The paper explores these four dimensions of intuition and, in doing so, compares moral intuition with moral perception. The overall aim is to clarify moral phenomenology both descriptively and epistemologically and to support the view that intuitions are often discriminative responses to experience and have justificatory power analogous to the power of sense-perceptions.
道德判断通常依赖于直觉。同样正确的是，尽管认同这一点的人较少，但伦理理论也依赖于直觉。直觉的本质和认知地位长期以来一直是哲学关注的问题，并且，随着伦理直觉主义作为伦理学中的一个主要立场的重要性日益增加，它们正受到诸多哲学关注。越来越多的人达成共识，即被视为一种表象的直觉对于道德判断的正当性和伦理理论的确认都至关重要。本文描述了几种重要的不同类型的直觉，尤其是那些常被称为……的偶发性直觉。这部分是通过勾勒大量直觉的例子来完成的。直觉表象以及基于它们的道德判断在内容、依据、认知权威和现象学方面存在差异。本文探讨了直觉的这四个维度，并在此过程中将道德直觉与道德感知进行了比较。总体目标是在描述和认知层面上澄清道德现象学，并支持这样一种观点，即直觉通常是对经验的有辨别力的反应，并且具有类似于感官感知能力的正当化力量。
