Żebrowski Piotr, Couce-Vieira Aitor, Mancuso Alessandro
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria.
Instituto de Ciencias Matemáticas, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid, Spain.
Risk Anal. 2022 Oct;42(10):2275-2290. doi: 10.1111/risa.13900. Epub 2022 Mar 1.
Critical infrastructures are increasingly reliant on information and communications technology (ICT) for more efficient operations, which, at the same time, exposes them to cyber threats. As the frequency and severity of cyberattacks are increasing, so are the costs of critical infrastructure security. Efficient allocation of resources is thus a crucial issue for cybersecurity. A common practice in managing cyber threats is to conduct a qualitative analysis of individual attack scenarios through risk matrices, prioritizing the scenarios according to their perceived urgency and addressing them in order until all the resources available for cybersecurity are spent. Apart from methodological caveats, this approach may lead to suboptimal resource allocations, given that potential synergies between different attack scenarios and among available security measures are not taken into consideration. To overcome this shortcoming, we propose a quantitative framework that features: (1) a more holistic picture of the cybersecurity landscape, represented as a Bayesian network (BN) that encompasses multiple attack scenarios and thus allows for a better appreciation of vulnerabilities; and (2) a multiobjective optimization model built on top of the said BN that explicitly represents multiple dimensions of the potential impacts of successful cyberattacks. Our framework adopts a broader perspective than the standard cost-benefit analysis and allows the formulation of more nuanced security objectives. We also propose a computationally efficient algorithm that identifies the set of Pareto-optimal portfolios of security measures that simultaneously minimize various types of expected cyberattack impacts, while satisfying budgetary and other constraints. We illustrate our framework with a case study of electric power grids.
关键基础设施越来越依赖信息通信技术(ICT)以实现更高效的运营,而这同时也使它们面临网络威胁。随着网络攻击的频率和严重程度不断增加,关键基础设施安全的成本也在上升。因此,资源的有效分配是网络安全的一个关键问题。管理网络威胁的常见做法是通过风险矩阵对单个攻击场景进行定性分析,根据感知到的紧迫性对场景进行优先级排序,并依次处理,直到用于网络安全的所有可用资源耗尽。除了方法上的缺陷外,这种方法可能会导致资源分配次优,因为没有考虑不同攻击场景之间以及可用安全措施之间的潜在协同效应。为了克服这一缺点,我们提出了一个定量框架,其特点是:(1)对网络安全态势有更全面的了解,以贝叶斯网络(BN)表示,该网络包含多个攻击场景,从而能够更好地评估漏洞;(2)在上述贝叶斯网络之上构建的多目标优化模型,明确表示成功的网络攻击潜在影响的多个维度。我们的框架采用了比标准成本效益分析更广泛的视角,并允许制定更细致入微的安全目标。我们还提出了一种计算效率高的算法,该算法能够识别安全措施的帕累托最优组合集,这些组合在满足预算和其他约束的同时,能同时最小化各种类型的预期网络攻击影响。我们通过一个电网的案例研究来说明我们的框架。