Gardner Andy, West Stuart A
Am Nat. 2004 Dec;164(6):753-764. doi: 10.1086/425623.
Explaining altruistic cooperation is one of the greatest challenges faced by sociologists, economists, and evolutionary biologists. The problem is determining why an individual would carry out a costly behavior that benefits another. Possible solutions to this problem include kinship, repeated interactions, and policing. Another solution that has recently received much attention is the threat of punishment. However, punishing behavior is often costly for the punisher, and so it is not immediately clear how costly punishment could evolve. We use a direct (neighbor-modulated) fitness approach to analyze when punishment is favored. This methodology reveals that, contrary to previous suggestions, relatedness between interacting individuals is not crucial to explaining cooperation through punishment. In fact, increasing relatedness directly disfavors punishing behavior. Instead, the crucial factor is a positive correlation between the punishment strategy of an individual and the cooperation it receives. This could arise in several ways, such as when facultative adjustment of behavior leads individuals to cooperate more when interacting with individuals who are more likely to punish. More generally, our results provide a clear example of how the fundamental factor driving the evolution of social traits is a correlation between social partners and how this can arise for reasons other than genealogical kinship.
解释利他合作是社会学家、经济学家和进化生物学家面临的最大挑战之一。问题在于确定为何个体会实施对他人有益但自身代价高昂的行为。这个问题的可能解决方案包括亲属关系、重复互动和监督。最近备受关注的另一个解决方案是惩罚威胁。然而,惩罚行为对惩罚者来说往往代价高昂,因此惩罚成本如何能够进化并不一目了然。我们使用直接(邻居调节)适合度方法来分析何时惩罚行为会受到青睐。这种方法表明,与之前的观点相反,互动个体之间的亲缘关系对于通过惩罚来解释合作并非至关重要。事实上,亲缘关系的增加会直接不利于惩罚行为。相反,关键因素是个体的惩罚策略与其所获得的合作之间的正相关关系。这可能通过多种方式出现,比如当行为的适应性调整使个体在与更有可能实施惩罚的个体互动时更多地进行合作。更一般地说,我们的结果清楚地表明,驱动社会特征进化的基本因素是社会伙伴之间的相关性,以及这种相关性如何能够因系谱亲属关系以外的原因而产生。