Center for Mathematics, Technische Universität München, 85748 Garching, Germany; Institute for Computational Biology, Helmholtz Center Munich, 85764 Neuherberg, Germany.
Professorship for Population Genetics, Department of Life Science Systems, School of Life Sciences, Technische Universität München, 85354 Freising, Germany.
Math Biosci. 2022 Jul;349:108826. doi: 10.1016/j.mbs.2022.108826. Epub 2022 Apr 28.
Due to the relevance for conservation biology, there is an increasing interest to extend evolutionary genomics models to plant, animal or microbial species. However, this requires to understand the effect of life-history traits absent in humans on genomic evolution. In this context, it is fundamentally of interest to generalize the replicator equation, which is at the heart of most population genomics models. However, as the inclusion of life-history traits generates models with a large state space, the analysis becomes involving. We focus, here, on quiescence and seed banks, two features common to many plant, invertebrate and microbial species. We develop a method to obtain a low-dimensional replicator equation in the context of evolutionary game theory, based on two assumptions: (1) the life-history traits are per se neutral, and (2) frequency-dependent selection is weak. We use the results to investigate the evolution and maintenance of cooperation based on the Prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game. We first consider the generalized replicator equation, and then refine the investigation using adaptive dynamics. It turns out that, depending on the structure and timing of the quiescence/dormancy life-history trait, cooperation in a homogeneous population can be stabilized. We finally discuss and highlight the relevance of these results for plant, invertebrate and microbial communities.
由于与保护生物学相关，人们越来越有兴趣将进化基因组学模型扩展到植物、动物或微生物物种。然而，这需要了解在人类中不存在的生活史特征对基因组进化的影响。在这种情况下，从根本上有兴趣推广复制子方程，它是大多数群体基因组学模型的核心。然而，由于生活史特征的包含会产生具有大状态空间的模型，因此分析变得复杂。我们在这里关注静止和种子库，这是许多植物、无脊椎动物和微生物物种共有的两个特征。我们开发了一种方法，在进化博弈论的背景下获得低维复制子方程，基于两个假设：(1) 生活史特征本身是中性的，(2) 频率依赖性选择较弱。我们使用这些结果来研究基于囚徒困境和雪堆博弈的合作的进化和维持。我们首先考虑广义复制子方程，然后使用自适应动力学对研究进行细化。事实证明，根据静止/休眠生活史特征的结构和时间，同质群体中的合作可以得到稳定。我们最后讨论并强调了这些结果对于植物、无脊椎动物和微生物群落的相关性。
