Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637, USA and Physics and Applied Mathematics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 203 B. T. Road, Kolkata 700108, India.
Chaos. 2023 Jul 1;33(7). doi: 10.1063/5.0153650.
Cooperation observed in nearly all living systems, ranging from human and animal societies down to the scale of bacteria populations, is an astounding process through which individuals act together for mutual benefits. Despite being omnipresent, the mechanism behind the emergence and existence of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals has been a puzzle and exceedingly crucial to investigate. A number of mechanisms have been put forward to explain the stability of cooperation in the last years. In this work, we explore the evolution of cooperation for alike (assortative) interactions in populations subject to social viscosity in terms of zealous individuals. We present a comprehensive study on how a finite fraction of these committed minorities present in both cooperators and defectors govern the evolutionary game dynamics where interactions among the individuals with same strategy are more probable than random interactions. We perform a detailed analysis concerning this synergy between alike interaction and the social viscosity in the opposing individuals. We scrutinize all three principal social dilemmas, namely, the prisoner's dilemma, the stag-hunt, and the snowdrift game, under such evolutionary setting. We have been successful to delineate this evolutionary scenario theoretically based upon the generalized replicator dynamics in the well-mixed regime.
合作在几乎所有的生命系统中都有观察到，从人类和动物社会到细菌种群的规模，这是一个惊人的过程，个体通过共同行动来实现互利。尽管合作无处不在，但在自私个体的群体中合作的出现和存在的机制一直是一个谜，并且对其进行研究至关重要。近年来，已经提出了许多机制来解释合作的稳定性。在这项工作中，我们探讨了在社会粘性条件下，同类（聚类）相互作用种群中的合作进化，我们提出了一个全面的研究，研究了在有限数量的这些热衷于合作的少数人和不合作者中的少数派如何控制进化博弈动态，其中同种策略的个体之间的相互作用比随机相互作用更有可能发生。我们详细分析了这种同类相互作用与对立个体之间的社会粘性之间的协同作用。我们在这种进化环境下，对囚徒困境、猎鹿博弈和雪堆博弈这三个主要的社会困境进行了全面的分析。我们已经成功地在混合状态下基于广义复制者动态理论对这种进化情况进行了理论描述。
